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Multilingual1 Prospective Jurors:
Assessing California Standards Twenty Years after
Hernandez v. New York
Farida Ali*
ABSTRACT
This Article explores the ramifications of linguistically motivated peremptory
challenges against multilingual prospective jurors in California in the twenty years since
such challenges were legitimatized under Hernandez v. New York. An examination of
state and federal case law reveals that the pretext analysis for reviewing Hernandezbased peremptory challenges remains both an arbitrary and a flawed tool that California
courts have, nevertheless, been reluctant to second-guess. This problem is particularly
acute in California because it is home to the largest multilingual population in the United
States, with 43% of Californians speaking a language other than English. California,
therefore, provides an exemplary context for a case study of these issues and its impact
on multilingual prospective jurors. However, it is important to recognize that the issues
raised by language-based peremptory challenges arise in many other jurisdictions, and
potentially affect a large number of Americans throughout the country.
The Article discusses the manner in which Hernandez-based peremptory
challenges, deference to lower court decisions allowing these challenges, and
discriminatory and ineffective state laws are interdependent, mutually reinforcing, and
combine to render multilingual individuals proportionately underrepresented in jury
service. The Article suggests that this problem signals a need to develop and institute
measures to protect multilinguals’ exercise of their right to jury participation. Among the
recommendations offered are the embellishment and refinement of strategies available to
parties objecting to linguistically based peremptory challenges. These changes would
help make California’s framework for responding to Hernandez more concrete, more
effective, and less discriminatory. The Article also proposes changes that the California
legislature, judges, courts, and litigating parties can make to reduce Hernandez’s
discriminatory impact and promote greater jury participation for multilinguals.

* Juris Doctor, 2013, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Shari
Diamond for her insights and comments and Manuel Cachan for inspiring me to write on an important topic
that affects our communities. I would also like to thank Joan Schipper and Pegeen Bassett for their
invaluable assistance. Lastly, I would like to thank the JLSP editors for their contributions to the
preparation of this article.
1
I use this more inclusive term (as compared to “bilinguals”) to account for individuals who speak one or
more languages other than English.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Linguistic diversity is a fact of life in the United States today, as it has been since
colonial times.2 According to a recent census, one-in-five Americans speaks at least one
foreign language at home.3 The constant entry of immigrants adds not only to the number
of foreign-language speakers, but also to the diversity of languages spoken in the United
States. Inevitably, such diversity brings a variety of challenges, including issues that
affect jurisprudence. Among these issues is the number of cases in which parties use
peremptory challenges to remove potential multilingual jurors.
In Hernandez v. New York,4 the ruling commonly cited to support these peremptory
strikes, the U.S. Supreme Court held that peremptory challenges were justified against
2

See Philip Martin & Elizabeth Midgley, Immigration to the United States, POPULATION BULLETIN 1, 14–
15 (June 1999). In the 16th and 17th centuries, English colonists established the groundwork for the society
that would become the United States. Id. at 14. These colonists expanded their territory in North America
when they “superimposed” their population on Native Americans and seized control of Dutch, French, and
Spanish settlements. Id. The importation of African slaves until the early 1800s further added to the
colonial population. Id. After the Mexican War ended in 1848, Mexicans in California, New Mexico, and
Texas were integrated into the population. Id. Between 1820 and 1840, German and Irish migrants began
arriving in North America in substantial numbers, and starting around 1880 several hundred thousand
Chinese, Japanese, and other Asian migrant laborers began settling in the western states. Id. at 15. The
variety of backgrounds, cultures, and languages that these groups possessed ultimately contributed to the
diversity of the United States.
3
Hyon B. Shin & Robert A. Kominski, Language Use in the United States: 2007, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU:
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY REPORTS, 2 (Apr. 2010) (80% of the U.S. population speaks only English,
while 20% speaks English and one or more other languages).
4
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
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bilingual speakers of English and Spanish on the basis of their bilingualism.5 The Court
recognized the close connection between language and race or national origin.6 However,
the Court held that the strikes were adequately explained as a precautionary measure
against the risk that jurors would ignore the official English translation of testimony
provided by the trial court.7 Employing a traditional and rigid nondiscrimination
framework, the Court decided that the strikes did not intentionally target race and,
therefore, did not violate the Constitution.8 This decision, albeit good law, has been
roundly criticized over the years for allowing racism in jury selection and for promoting
the widespread exclusion of multilingual jurors.9
This Article argues that, in the twenty years since Hernandez, California state and
federal courts have continued to play an important role in facilitating language-based
exclusions that deny multilinguals their right to participate in jury service. This Article
also argues that language-based exclusions deprive litigants and the courts of diverse
juries that are demonstrably better decision makers who use balance and impartiality
during deliberations. The Article further argues that if existing doctrine and practice
remain unchanged, Batson will continue to allow reliance on language as a pretext for
race in jury selection, thereby disenfranchising racial and linguistic minorities, and
undermining public perception of integrity in the judicial process.
The problem of language-based peremptory challenges is particularly acute in
California because the state is home to the largest multilingual population in the United
States, with 43% of Californians speaking a language other than English.10 California,
therefore, provides an exemplary context for a case study of this issue and its impact on
multilinguals. It is important to recognize, however, that the issues raised by languagebased peremptory challenges arise in many other jurisdictions, particularly in other states
with a high percentage of multilinguals in their population, such as Texas (34%), New
York (29%), Arizona (29%), New Jersey (28%), Nevada (27%), and Florida (26%).11
Thus, although this Article focuses on the problem as it has unfolded in California, the
exclusion of multilingual jurors is not merely a state or regional issue, but one that
potentially affects a large number of Americans in many parts of the country.
In exploring California’s framework for facilitating language-based exclusions, this
Article examines the state’s standard of review, the pretext analysis,12 and how it has
been applied in practice with respect to peremptory challenges of multilinguals. The
Article also considers California statutes regarding language and jury selection, and
5

Id. at 361.
Id. at 370–72.
7
Id. at 361.
8
Id. at 358–361.
9
See Marina Hsieh, Language-Qualifying Juries to Exclude Bilingual Speakers, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1181,
1206 (2001) (excluding multilingual jurors amounts to an exclusion of those most able to address the
growing needs of our multilingual courts); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference:
Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
133, 133 (2001) (arguing the U.S. Supreme Court’s clumsy treatment of the bilingual juror reflects a
fundamental deficiency in our legal system).
10
Shin et al., supra note 3, at 9.
11
Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 73.
12
A pretextual analysis for linguistic discrimination requires the trial court to determine whether the
striking party’s race-neutral explanation for disproportionately excluding potential jurors who speak a
given language is a pretext for racial discrimination. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 354.
6
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whether they contribute to the attrition of linguistic minorities in voir dire. The Article
suggests that California’s framework is seriously flawed and that, given the likelihood
that peremptory challenges will continue as a fixture in jury selection, added measures
are needed to protect multilinguals’ right to serve on juries.
Part II of this Article focuses on the history of Hernandez v. New York. This review
looks to the rationale of Hernandez, its standard of review, and its progeny, Johnson v.
California. Part III considers the California Constitution and how it paved the way for
Hernandez. Part IV considers California’s framework for removing potential jurors.
Specifically, it examines California’s application of the pretext analysis for reviewing
Hernandez-based peremptory challenges. Part V considers the implications of
California’s pretext analysis with respect to multilinguals and discusses serious problems
in this regard, including the likelihood that, when combined with existing California
statutes, peremptory challenges further disenfranchise linguistic minorities. Part VI offers
recommendations to judges, courts, and litigating parties for improving on the traditional
pretext analysis. This section suggests that adding to, and refining, the existing methods
available to an objecting party, who must develop a factual record showing linguistic
discrimination, can make California’s framework more concrete and effective. Among
the recommendations offered is the adoption of a Second Circuit standard to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. Part VI also proposes statutory changes to the
California legislature that would limit the impact of Hernandez on linguistic minorities.
Finally, Part VI proposes a jury instruction to California courts that acknowledges and
incorporates the linguistic experience of multilingual jurors.
II. THE HISTORY OF LANGUAGE-BASED CHALLENGES
A. Hernandez v. New York’s Rationale
Hernandez v. New York involved Dionisio Hernandez, who was convicted of
attempted murder in Brooklyn, New York, a jurisdiction with a large multilingual
population.13 At Hernandez’s trial, the prosecution used peremptory challenges to
disqualify bilingual jurors, citing hesitation by the jurors during voir dire when they were
asked whether they could disregard direct testimony in Spanish and heed only the English
translation of the court interpreter.14 Hernandez’s attorney protested that this was a ruse
to keep Latinos off the jury who might be sympathetic to his client.15 The prosecutor
countered that he was not convinced the jurors would be able to follow the translation
offered by the court interpreter, and that this inability could give those jurors an undue
influence over the jury.16 While the prosecutor admitted that after further questioning the
jurors said they could follow the interpreter, the trial judge accepted the prosecutor’s
“race-neutral” explanation. In a six-to-three decision, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
with the trial judge.17

13

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355–56.
Id. at 356.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 356–57.
17
Id. at 353, 356.
14
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According to the plurality opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, while racial
discrimination in jury selection has long been understood to be a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause,18 excluding bilingual jurors is not unconstitutional.19 Justice Kennedy
suggested that language classifications merely divide potential jurors into people who
would be able to accept official court translations at face value, and those who would
not.20 That such challenges inevitably exclude a disproportionate number of multilinguals
is not dispositive.21 So long as the explanation is not inherently discriminatory, it would
not be considered race-based as a matter of law.22
B. Batson v. Kentucky: The Standard of Review
In determining whether the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to disqualify
multilingual jurors in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court applied the
three-pronged test established in Batson v. Kentucky,23 a landmark decision forbidding
prosecutors from using peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors solely because of
their race.24 The first step of the test requires the objecting party to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination.25 Next, the burden shifts to the striking party, who must put forth
a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge.26 The Supreme Court cautioned
that in determining whether the striking party has satisfied the requirements of Batson’s
second step, a court must keep in mind that the Batson decision rests on the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which means that peremptory strikes
are prohibited on the basis of race.27 The third step delegates to the trial court the duty of
determining whether the objecting party established purposeful discrimination.28
In designing this test, the Court in Batson accorded great deference to the
prosecutor’s stated intent, holding that a “race-neutral” explanation meant an explanation
based on something other than race.29 Any explanation proffered, so long as it does not
specifically mention race, has therefore been deemed race-neutral by lower courts based
on Justice Kennedy’s instruction in Hernandez that “unless a discriminatory intent is
18

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”).
19
Hernandez, 500 U.S. 361–62.
20
Id. at 361 (observing that each group would include Latinos and non-Latinos).
21
Id. at 359–60 (explaining disproportionate impact is inconclusive in determining race neutrality).
22
Id. at 360.
23
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), modified, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
24
The Supreme Court later expanded the Batson limitation. See Powers 499 U.S. at 416 (applies to crossracial objections); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (applies to civil
proceedings); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55 (1992) (applies to criminal proceedings); J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 144–45 (1994) (applies to gender); U.S. v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S.
304 (2000) (applies to ethnic origin).
25
Batson, 476 U.S. at 94.
26
Id.
27
See Powers, 499 U.S. at 409 (“[R]acial exclusion of prospective jurors violates the overriding command
of the Equal Protection Clause, and ‘race-based exclusion is no more permissible at the individual petit jury
stage than at the venire stage’. . . [T]he Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using the
State’s peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from the petit jury
solely by reason of their race, a practice that forecloses a significant opportunity to participate in civic
life.”).
28
Baston, 476 U.S. at 94–95.
29
Id.
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inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race
neutral.”30
Admittedly, the Court in Hernandez recognized that a challenge based on
linguistic ability could be “inherently” race-neutral or discriminatory depending upon the
context;31 however, it took no steps to protect linguistic minorities, revealing its failure to
grasp the ramifications of the Hernandez decision.32 The dissent, by contrast, appeared to
be more aware of these ramifications. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, proposed a slightly different test. The dissenters argued that after the defense
established a prima facie case in a Batson challenge, the striking party should have to
provide an explanation that was not only race-neutral, but plausible and sufficiently
persuasive.33
The Hernandez prosecution’s concern with potential jurors’ ability to accept the
official version of the testimony was neither plausible nor sufficiently persuasive
because: (1) if the prosecutor’s concern was legitimate, he could have challenged the
jurors for cause,34 and; (2) the prosecutor’s concern could have been remedied by a judge,
who could have instructed the jurors that only the official English testimony would be
considered as evidence, or otherwise provided the jury with limiting instructions.35
Moreover, allowing language-based justifications for peremptory strikes is likely to lead
to the disproportionate exclusion of multilingual jurors.36 In essence, the Hernandez
decision afforded striking parties wide leeway in exercising peremptory challenges,
allowing the use of language as a pretext for race, no matter how implausible, so long as
there was arguably a facially race-neutral reason for the exclusions. The latitude thus
permitted was excessive in Hernandez and, as a result, in a great many cases ever since.
Nonetheless, it is unclear how different the dissent’s standard would have been in
practice and effect since: (1) it also relies on the notion of “race-neutral”37 explanations,
and; (2) it distinguishes between justifications that are pretextual (i.e., “unacceptable”)
and those that are implausible (i.e., likely to be wrong because they are “insufficient to
dispel [an] inference of racial animus”),38 but fails to provide examples of “plausible”
reasons that would comport with its test. The dissenters’ reliance on jury instructions as a
curative measure also presumes that jurors always follow the court’s instructions, and
that these instructions are adequate and effectively address a juror’s inability or
unwillingness to accept the official English version of testimony. However, it is

30

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360.
Id. at 371 (“It may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a
particular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection
analysis.”).
32
See infra note 181.
33
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34
Id. at 379; see subpart IV(A) for a discussion of challenges “for cause”; see also Nancy S. Marder,
Justice Stevens, The Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1715–17 (2006)
(suggesting eliminating the peremptory challenge and expanding the “for cause” challenge to end
discrimination during jury selection).
35
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 379.
36
Id.
37
See Part V for a discussion of the problems inherent in the “race-neutral” test.
38
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31

241

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2013

important to recognize that jury instructions are not always curative,39 and might not have
been helpful in Hernandez, because the jurors expressed their hesitancy following the
Court’s instructions.40
C. Johnson v. California: Clarifying the Batson Standard
Fourteen years after the Hernandez decision, the Court granted certiorari in
Johnson v. California 41 to resolve a conflict between the California Supreme Court and
the Ninth Circuit regarding the standards applied to step one, or the prima facie prong, of
the Batson analysis.42 Johnson involved the trial of a black man convicted of murder and
assault of a young child. During jury selection, the prosecutor used peremptory
challenges against all three black jury panelists.43 The defense objected to their
disqualification on the basis of the Batson doctrine, but the trial judge overruled the
objection.44 The judge held that the precedent established by the state in People v.
Wheeler 45 required the defense to show a “strong likelihood” of racial discrimination at
step one of the Batson test.46 The California Court of Appeal disagreed, however, and set
aside the conviction,47 arguing that the “strong likelihood” standard was incorrect and
that the proper standard was a “reasonable inference” of discrimination used by federal
courts, including the Ninth Circuit.48
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reinstated the defendant’s conviction.49 It
held that under Wheeler, the California standard would require showing a “strong
likelihood,” or that it was “more likely than not,” that discrimination occurred in the use
of peremptory challenges.50 The court defended its decision as consistent with Batson,
which allowed states to establish their own procedures. Upon review, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court disagreed and interpreted Batson as only giving states “flexibility in

39

Jury instructions do not always have a curative effect because they may be incomprehensible or because
jurors choose to disregard the law or the judge’s instructions. See Joseph Kimble, How to Mangle Court
Rules and Jury Instructions, 8 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 39, 40 (2001) (“Jury instructions are notoriously
incomprehensible to the public.”); James H. Gold, Voir Dire: Questioning Prospective Jurors on Their
Willingness to Follow the Law, 60 IND. L. J. 163, 178 (1984) (“The assumption that jurors will follow the
law appears to be based primarily on wishful thinking. While jurors do not have the right to disregard the
judge’s instructions, they clearly have the power and are often willing to use it.”); see also infra subpart
VI(D).
40
See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362.
41
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005).
42
See id. at 166.
43
See id. at 164–65.
44
See id.
45
People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 752 (Cal. 1978) (all-white jury convicted two black men of robbery as
a result of the prosecution’s peremptory strikes and cause challenges to remove all black potential jurors
during voir dire), modified, People v. Willis, 43 P.3d 130 (Cal. 2002); see also infra Part IV, subpart IV(A)
for peremptory challenges and challenges for cause.
46
Johnson, 545 U.S. at 164–65 (2005) (quoting People v. Johnson, 71 P.3d 270, 272 (Cal. 2003)).
47
See id; People v. Johnson, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727 (1st Dist. 2001).
48
Johnson, 545 U.S. at 164–67. The California Court of Appeal based its decision on Wade v. Terhune,
202 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Wheeler’s “‘strong likelihood’ . . . test was
impermissibly stringent in comparison to the more lenient Batson ‘inference’ test”).
49
See Johnson, 545 U.S. at 166.
50
Id.
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formulating appropriate procedures to comply with Batson,” but that the standard was
created by the Court and, therefore, not for each state to set.51
Justice Stevens, this time writing for the majority, argued that the “reasonable
inference” standard, and not California’s “more likely than not” standard, was
appropriate because it fit Batson’s original intentions.52 California’s much stricter test
was an “inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a prima facie
case”53 because Batson had not intended “the first step to be so onerous” that a defendant
would have to persuade the judge on the basis of facts that are often “impossible . . . to
know with certainty.”54 The Court, in essence, held that the California standard was far
more severe, and thus inappropriate because it made Batson challenges very difficult to
raise from the outset.
Under Batson’s first step, a party need only produce evidence sufficient to permit
the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.55 In other words, the
evidence need only be sufficient to support an inference that the disqualification was a
result of purposeful discrimination, even though the Court failed to specify the kind of
evidence that would establish a reasonable inference. To the Court, the standard requiring
that a party merely raise a reasonable inference was appropriate because it allowed lower
courts to hear “actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have
infected the jury selection process” and, in doing so, performed the kind of oversight that
Batson contemplated.56 Presumably, the Court believed that California’s “more likely
than not” standard would prevent many claims from surviving beyond step one and
would force judges to make the kinds of decisions at step one that were meant for step
three.
By mandating a lower prima facie threshold than California’s “strong likelihood”
standard, the Court hoped to restrict California’s ability to alter the Batson test.57 The
lower threshold would allow more Batson challenges to satisfy the first step and proceed
through to the second and third steps of the framework. The actual impact of the decision
appears minimal, however, because empirical studies show that even prior to Johnson it
was not difficult to establish step one of the Batson test.58
III. THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION: PAVING THE WAY FOR HERNANDEZ
The Hernandez decision was certainly timely. Five years before Hernandez, in the
midterm election of 1986, California voters passed Proposition 63.59 Proposition 63
51

See id. at 168.
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 170.
55
See id. at 170–71.
56
Johnson, 545 U.S. at 172.
57
Id. at 170–73.
58
See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 460–61 (1996) (examining Batson state and federal court
decisions from 1986 to 1993).
59
California Proposition 63, or the “English Is the Official Language of California” Amendment, was a
state constitutional amendment that declared English as the official language of California after passing by
a margin of 73% in the 1986 midterm election. This amendment has been interpreted as a political move to
disenfranchise linguistic minorities. See Connie Dyste, Proposition 63: The California English Language
52
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amended the state constitution to declare that English is the official language of
California. The amendment resulted in the addition of the following passage to the state’s
constitution:
English is the common language of the people of the United States of
America and the State of California. This section is intended to preserve,
protect, and strengthen the English language . . . The Legislature and
officials of the State of California shall take all steps necessary to insure
that the role of English as the common language of the State of California
is preserved and enhanced.60
To date, thirty-one states, including California, have passed such “Official English”
laws. The U.S. federal government, by contrast, has never declared English or any other
idiom to be the nation’s official language.62
Various other California statutes require that public activities be conducted in
English alone, including the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires that English be used
in all judicial proceedings.63 Interestingly, before Hernandez was decided in 1991,
California’s Code of Civil Procedure already excluded potential jurors from serving if
they were “not possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language, provided that
no person shall be deemed incompetent solely because of the loss of sight or hearing in
any degree or other disability which impedes the person's ability to communicate or
which impairs or interferes with the person’s mobility.”64 In essence, a potential juror
61

Amendment, 10 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 313, 314, 327–29 (1989) (The constitutional amendment was not
merely symbolic but a political move to fight the use of languages other than English in California. Indeed,
the amendment provides, among other things, a constitutional basis for challenging the legality of bilingual
education programs and allows any person doing business in California to sue the state to enforce the
amendment. Data from the California poll survey demonstrates that the strongest supporters of the
amendment were whites, the less educated, and conservatives; the strongest opponents were Latinos,
Asians, the highly educated, and liberals.); see also Susannah D.A. MacKaye, California Proposition 63:
Language Attitudes Reflected in the Public Debate, 508 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 135, 137,
144 (1990) (Although the purpose of Proposition 63 was to declare English as California’s official
language, published commentary reveals a widely held belief that it was to ensure that English remain the
common language of California, which would make clear to immigrants and other outsiders that they
cannot “get along” in the United States without the benefit of English.).
60
CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6(a), (c) (West 2012).
61
See Official English Map, PROENGLISH.ORG, http://www.proenglish.org/official-english/state-profiles
(last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
62
See Debate: English as US Official Language, DEBATEPEDIA,
http://debatepedia.idebate.org/en/index.php/Debate:_English_as_US_official_language (last
visited Apr. 23, 2012).
63
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 185 (West 2012). It is important to note that California is not unique in
requiring that English be used in all judicial proceedings, and this rule even holds in Puerto Rico. See, e.g.,
Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, The Exclusion of Non-English Speaking Jurors: Remedying a Century of Denial
of the Sixth Amendment in the Federal Courts of Puerto Rico, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 497 (2011).
However, there are exceptions, with states like New Mexico providing a contrast with California in
requiring English language skills for jurors. See id.; Edward L. Chávez, New Mexico's Success with NonEnglish Speaking Jurors, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 303 (2008).
64
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203 (West 2012) (added by Stats. 1988, c. 1245).
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cannot be excluded in California solely on the basis of a physical or other disability, but
can be excluded for lack of “sufficient” English language skills.65
A disturbing aspect of these “Official English” laws is that they negatively impact
multilinguals’ participation in jury service by excluding those who speak no English at
all, as well as those who do not speak sufficient English to participate in jury service.
While practical considerations exist that support the disqualification of non-English
speakers from serving on juries,66 the problem with the California practice—and with
others like it—lies in the difficulty of determining, in a non-arbitrary fashion, what
constitutes English language sufficiency. For example, half of the California judges who
participated in a language proficiency study said that “English sufficiency” meant being
able to understand “broadly” what was said in the courtroom, whereas the other half said
that it meant being able to understand “everything.” 67
According to the 2010 U.S. Census, at the end of 2007, non-English-speaking
Californians comprised 10% of the state’s population of individuals who speak languages
other than English (43% of the state’s total population), while Californians who did not
speak English well comprised 17% of that sub-group.68 The census data also reported that
of those Californians who speak other languages, 53% could speak English “very well”
and 20% could speak English “well.” 69 It is tempting to conclude that 73% of
multilingual Californians who speak English “well” or “very well” provide a substantial
pool of potential jurors for voir dire. California’s statutory exclusions, however,
significantly reduce the multilingual jury pool because the exclusions bar Californians
from serving on juries if they are not: (1) at least 18 years of age; (2) U.S. citizens; (3)
deemed competent by reason of mental or physical infirmities; (4) residents of the county
65

Rule 203’s legislative history does not provide any reasons for this distinction, leading some scholars to
call it “arbitrary” because the distinction incorporates neither a much-needed analysis of the goals of the
court system, nor an assessment of the costs and benefits of having interpreters available for, e.g., the
hearing impaired but not for non-English-speaking potential jurors. See Colin A. Kisor, Using Interpreters
to Assist Jurors: A Plea for Consistency, 22 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 37, 47 (2001). It has been argued
that practical considerations exist in excluding individuals for lack of “sufficient” English language skills
from serving on juries because: (1) “English is the language of the court proceedings and the secret jury
room deliberations”; (2) Translators are not allowed in the jury deliberation rooms, and; (3) English
preserves the uniformity federal courts seek. See Josh Hill, et al., Watch Your Language! The Kansas Law
Review Survey of Official-English and English-Only Laws and Policies, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 669, 710–11
(2009). However, these arguments could also apply to jurors with hearing impairments. These arguments,
moreover, fail to explain why courts must “differentiate between interpreters for the deaf and for nonEnglish speakers, when the two interpreters perform an identical function.” Kisor, supra note 65, at 51.
Indeed, it seems “immaterial” whether an interpreter was “provided to translate orally in English or
Spanish, or into sign language, or both, so long as the juror is able to understand the proceedings, and
participate in deliberations . . . and [this view is further] reinforced if one subscribes to the viewpoint that
the deaf are not handicapped, but instead are a ‘linguistic minority.’” Id. at 47. Although it is unclear
whether this view is common among advocates, the point is that the courts should recognize on a functional
level that there is no genuine difference between providing a court interpreter for a deaf juror or for a nonEnglish speaker.
66
See Hill, supra note 65.
67
See Jana Anette Radmann, Do You Speak English?: A Study On English Language Proficiency Testing of
Hispanic Defendants in U.S. Criminal Courts, 63–64 (May 4, 2005) (master’s thesis), available at
http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-04142005-224929/.
68
Shin et al., supra note 3, at 9.
69
Id. at 8–10.
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in which they are to serve, and; (5) free from any felony convictions.70 The group that
remains after this first round of disqualifications is further reduced because it includes
low-income racial minorities who are either excused for financial hardship or who fail to
respond to jury summonses because of their higher mobility relative to the overall
population.71 This combination of factors produces an artificially small pool of linguistic
minorities that is then further reduced by the exercise of peremptory challenges, which
disproportionately target racial minorities.72 Although no study provides data showing the
number of linguistic minorities excluded at each of these stages, studies do show that
linguistic minorities continue to be underrepresented in California venires, as well as
venires in many other jurisdictions.73
70

See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 190, § 203 (West 2012). I only discuss those statutory exceptions relevant to
this Article. Readers interested in viewing a complete list of California’s statutory exclusions should refer
to CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203 (West 2012).
71
See CAL. CT. R. 2.1008(d) (potential jurors can be excused for undue hardship); Hiroshi Fukurai, Race,
Social Class, and Jury Participation: New Dimensions for Evaluating Discrimination in Jury Service and
Jury Selection, 24 J. CRIM. JUST. 71, 84–85 (1996) (racial and ethnic minorities, and those with low-income
status, are underrepresented in venires); see also ROBERT G. BOATRIGHT, IMPROVING CITIZEN RESPONSE TO
JURY SUMMONSES 15, 120–124 (1998) (because minorities are underrepresented on voting rolls, they are
underrepresented on jury rolls); HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY 45 (1993) (minorities’ lowincome status and involvement in secondary labor markets increases their mobility and, by extension,
decreases their jury eligibility); Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury
Composition: Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1055 (2003) (greater
mobility, which causes low response rates to jury summonses, and financial hardship play an important role
in minority participation in jury service).
72
Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing A Jury That Is Both Impartial And Representative:
Utilizing Cumulative Voting In Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 705–06 (1998) (arguing that
although Batson was intended to remedy the striking of minority potential jurors, it has failed to deter the
practice since minorities report to the courthouse at a lower rate, and are eliminated through peremptory
strikes that employ race-neutral explanations).
73
See Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Alameda County Jury Pools, ACLU OF NORTHERN CAL., 3 (2010)
(Latinos represent 12% of the eligible jury pool but comprise only 8% of individuals appearing for jury
service in Alameda, California); Lawsuit Thrown Out Over Underrepresented Latino Jurors,10NEWS.COM
(June 12, 2008), http://www.10news.com/news/lawsuit-thrown-out-over-underrepresented-latino-jurors
(Latinos represent 19% of the eligible jury pool in downtown San Diego, but only 9.4% of individuals
actually appear for jury service); Final Report of the California Judicial Council Advisory Committee on
Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Courts, JUD. COUNCIL CAL., Jan. 1997, at 193–95 (In Redding, California,
Native Americans and Asians are almost never part of the jury pool. In Fresno, California, “[The jury pool]
is clearly unrepresentative . . . in part because jury summonses are not enforced, and in part because the
Department of Motor Vehicles list excludes those with suspended driver’s licenses as well as those without
licenses, so that in some rural courts, where the population consists of more than 70% minorities, a jury
with even one or two minorities is unusual.”); Mary R. Rose, Shari Seidman Diamond & Marc A. Musick,
Selected to Serve: An Analysis of Lifetime Jury Participation, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 33, 45 (2012)
(Latinos and Asians are significantly less likely than whites to have served on one or more juries in
California and Texas); Ann Pfau, First Annual Report Pursuant to Section 528 of the Judiciary Law, CHIEF
ADMIN. JUDGE N. Y. 16, 16 (2011) (Latinos in New York state were underrepresented by 39% in Nassau,
22% in New York, 47% in Suffolk, 45% in Westchester, and 35% in Queens); Summoning Jurors,
ARIZONA JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jury/jury/jury1i1.htm (last visited Apr. 23,
2012) (The 1993 report on jurors in Maricopa, Arizona “reveals that Hispanics were 61%
underrepresented.”); Ted M. Eades, Revisiting the Jury System in Texas: A Study of the Jury Pool in Dallas
County, 54 S.M.U. L. REV. 1813, 1815 (2001) (“Hispanic Americans represent 23% of the population in
Dallas County but only 9% of the venire.”); Robert Walters & Mark Curriden, A Jury of One's Peers?
Investigating Underrepresentation in Jury Venires, 43 JUDGES J. 17, 17 (2004) (“Latinos, the fastest
growing ethnic community in the United States, are substantially underrepresented in the jury venires [of
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IV. CALIFORNIA’S FRAMEWORK FOR REMOVING POTENTIAL JURORS
A. Challenges For Cause and Peremptory Challenges
As in other states, parties in California may challenge potential jurors for cause or
remove them through the exercise of peremptory challenges. Challenges for cause fall
into two categories: implied bias and actual bias. Bias can be implied if a potential juror:
(1) has an affinity to any party or witness in the case; (2) is related to the parties or to the
victim; (3) has already served on a jury in which either party was present, or; (4) has an
interest in the outcome of the trial.74 Actual bias exists if the potential juror’s “state of
mind” prevents him or her “from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to
the substantial rights of any party.”75 An attorney challenging for cause must present
evidence to show that the juror should be excused.76 The judge will then base the decision
on the evidence submitted by counsel, which often includes consideration of information
from counsel’s interview with the juror and counsel’s arguments.
Potential jurors can also be removed by using peremptory challenges.77 A
peremptory challenge allows each party to disqualify prospective jurors without having to
provide a reason.78 In both civil and criminal cases peremptory challenges are limited,
with the allowed number varying according to the gravity of the offense charged and the
number of parties involved.79 Challenges for cause, by contrast, are unlimited.80
Interestingly, nothing in the U.S. Constitution requires the states or the federal
government to provide peremptory challenges. Nonetheless, peremptory challenges have
endured since the earliest days of common law.81 Attorneys have often used them when
mere “hunches,” “suspicions,” or “arbitrary exclusions” do not rise to the level of cause.82
The U.S. Supreme Court has tried to respond to the dangers associated with peremptory
challenges, which include violations of the Equal Protection Clause, by allowing parties
to dispute their use under Batson.83
Dallas and Harris, Texas].”); see also Final Report of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee on
Racial & Gender Bias in the Justice System, COMM. ON RACIAL & GENDER BIAS JUST. SYS. 54 (2003)
(Pennsylvania jury selection mechanisms “fail at each step of the process to include a representative
number of minorities.”); South Dakota Equal Justice Commission, Final Report & Recommendations, S. D.
EQUAL JUST. COMM’N 8 (2006) (“Juries in South Dakota rarely represent the racial composition of a
community.”); Where the Injured Fly for Justice: A Ten-Year Retrospect on the Report &
Recommendations of the Florida Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission, FLA. SUP. CT.
RACIAL & ETHNIC BIAS STUDY COMM’N 13 (2000) (current jury selection mechanisms in Florida do not
result in juries that “are racial and ethnic composites of the community.”); Final Report, MINN. SUP. CT.
TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUD. SYS. S-14 (1993) (“[J]ury pools rarely are representative of the
racial composition of [Minnesota] communities.”).
74
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 229 (West 2012). I discuss only the general principles of implied bias; therefore,
readers interested in viewing specific provisions of the statute should refer directly to CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 229.
75
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 225 (West 2012).
76
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 230 (West 2012) (“Challenges for cause shall be tried by the court.”).
77
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 225(b)(2) (West 2012).
78
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 226(b) (West 2012).
79
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231(a), (c) (West 2012).
80
Palacios v. Felker, No. CV 07-4470-RGK(JTL), 2008 WL 793373, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008).
81
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212–13 (1965), overruled by, Batson, 476 U.S. 79.
82
See Driver v. Trimble, No. C 10-2564 SI (pr), slip op. at 11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2011).
83
See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 352.
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B. Current Standard for Reviewing Peremptory Challenges
As in federal court, a party in California state court that raises a Batson challenge to
oppose a striking party’s use of a peremptory challenge must make a timely objection,84
demonstrate on the record that the challenged persons are members of a distinct racial
group,85 and show that there is a reasonable inference that they have been challenged
because of their race.86 The objecting party must allege that the strike is racially
motivated and request the court to ask the striking party to justify its action. If the court
finds that a reasonable inference of racial motivation exists, the burden shifts to the
striking party to show that the strikes were not racially motivated.87 If the striking party’s
explanation is not facially race-neutral, then the court dismisses the jury pool to start voir
dire again or applies alternative judicial remedies.88 However, if the explanation is
facially neutral, believable, and not a pretext for race, then the court will accept the
explanation and the strike sustained.89
As a first step, both federal and California state courts must determine whether a
person or group fits into a “cognizable class” to have standing and assert a Batson
challenge.90 First, the analysis involves whether the objecting party’s group is large
enough that the general community recognizes it as an identifiable population. Second,
the analysis considers whether the group is internally cohesive, based on attitudes or
experiences that may not be adequately represented by other segments of society.91
However, national origin, native language, and surname are not dispositive in
establishing a person’s ethnicity.92 The trial court retains discretion to make this
determination when an objection is made to a peremptory challenge.93
Once the court determines that a person fits into a cognizable class, contextdependent features of the case are considered to determine whether the likelihood of
racial motivation exists. The types of evidence that may be relevant include whether: (1)
most or all of the members of the identified group were excused; (2) a disproportionate
number of peremptory challenges were exercised against the group; (3) the jurors in
question share only one characteristic—i.e., their membership in the group—and are in
other respects heterogeneous, and; (4) the failure to engage these jurors, as either a result
84

See People v. Morrison, 101 P.3d 568, 577 (Cal. 2004).
See People v. Ramos, 938 P.2d 950, 964 (Cal. 1997).
86
See Morrison, 101 P.3d at 577; Ramos, 938 P.2d at 964.
87
See People v. Reynoso, 74 P.3d 852, 869 (Cal. 2003).
88
See People v. Willis, 27 Cal. 4th 811, 819 (2002) (holding a court can declare a mistrial and discharge the
jury venire, or apply alternative remedies if it chooses to do so, including assessment of sanctions against
counsel whose peremptory challenges exhibit group bias and reseating any improperly discharged jurors if
they are available to serve).
89
See People v. Jurado, 131 P.3d 406, 421 (Cal. 2006).
90
See Ramos, 938 P.2d 950 (Latinos); In re Freeman, 133 P.3d 1013, 1022 (2006) (religious groups);
People v. Cleveland, 86 P.3d 302 (Cal. 2004) (African-American women); People v. Gray, 104 Cal. Rptr.
2d 848 (2d Dist. 2001) (African-American men).
91
See Yee v. Duncan, 463 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2006); People v. Morris, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 872 (2d Dist.
2003).
92
See Ramos, 938 P.2d 950 (Latinos); Gray, 104 Cal. Rptr. 848 (2d Dist. 2001) (African-American men);
Cleveland, 86 P.3d 302 (African-American women); People v. Davis, 208 P.3d 78 (Cal. 2009) (religious
groups).
93
See Cleveland, 86 P.3d at 324 (trial court has wide discretion in conducting voir dire and retains great
latitude in deciding what questions or factors to consider in voir dire).
85
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of desultory94 voir dire or a calculated decision on the part of the striking party not to ask
them any questions.95
In drawing an inference of discrimination from the fact that a striking party has
excused “most or all members of a cognizable group,” the court, in finding a prima facie
case, relies on an apparent pattern in the party’s challenges.96 However, such patterns are
“difficult to discern when the number of challenges is extremely small.”97 Thus, detecting
a pattern of discrimination is difficult in practice because, as noted above, linguistic
minorities are already underrepresented in California jury pools.
In any case, once the objecting party has established a prima facie case, the burden
then shifts to the striking party to provide a race-neutral explanation for the exercise of
peremptory challenges.98 Under Batson, a legitimate reason in this second step must be
race neutral.99 The second step does not require an explanation that is persuasive or
plausible; the issue is simply the “facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.”100
However, there will “seldom be much evidence bearing on the issue, and the best
evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.”101
Thus, the determination comes down to a court evaluating the striking party’s state of
mind, via demeanor, which “lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.”102
Under Batson, a striking party cannot assume in exercising peremptory challenges
that because a prospective juror belongs to a cognizable minority group that the
prospective juror holds views that are undesirable for the position.103 However, the
striking party may excuse prospective minority jurors based on personal, individual
biases even if these views or attitudes may be more widely held inside than outside the
cognizable group.104 It is perfectly valid, for example, for a party to strike an AfricanAmerican juror because he or she has a bias against police officers, even though this view
may be more widely held within the African-American community than outside it.105 A
striking party’s justification for excluding linguistic minorities who respond
“equivocally” is also race neutral when based on a distrust of these jurors’ ability to
restrict themselves to the interpreter’s official English translation.106 Furthermore, a given
juror’s demeanor or “body language,” which may include “alienating bare looks and
gestures,” is a proper basis for disqualifying a potential juror.107
94

A party can demonstrate that his or her opponent engaged in desultory voir dire, which means that the
opponent subjected potential jurors to inappropriate, unfocused, or random questioning before striking
them from the jury pool. See People v. Fuller, 186 Cal. Rptr. 283, 293–294 (3d Dist. 1982), which
illustrates this type of objection.
95
See Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002); People v. Crittenden, 885 P.2d 887, 905, 119
(Cal. 1994).
96
People v. Bell, 151 P.3d 292, 30 n.3 (Cal. 2007).
97
People v. Bonilla, 160 P.3d 84, 104 n.12 (Cal. 2007).
98
See id. at 103.
99
See McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1220 (9th Cir. 2000).
100
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
101
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365.
102
People v. Lenix, 187 P.3d 946, 955 (Cal. 2008).
103
People v. Lewis, 140 P.3d 775, 812 (Cal. 2006).
104
Id. at 812–813.
105
See id. at 809–810.
106
See People v. Lomax, 234 P.3d 377 (Cal. 2010).
107
People v. Phillips, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 678, 684 (3d Dist. 2007).
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If a race-neutral explanation is provided, the trial court must decide, in step three,
whether the opponent of the peremptory challenge has proven purposeful racial
discrimination.108 In this third step, the plausibility or persuasiveness of the striking
party’s justification becomes relevant and “implausible or fantastic justifications may
(and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.”109
The trial court has a duty to determine the credibility of the striking party’s
purported reasons for exercising the challenge,110 but the “burden of persuasion” to prove
purposeful discrimination rests with, and never shifts from, the objecting party.111 Even
when the inquiry is unfavorable, the objecting party must renew his or her objection
before the jury is sworn to preserve the issue for appeal.112 In making its credibility
determination with respect to the proffered reasons, the court must determine whether the
striking party has given a “clear and reasonably specific explanation” of the reasons for
exercising a peremptory challenge.113 The court must consider the “totality of the relevant
facts,” including the striking party’s strategies and explanations, whether racial or nonracial, for striking potential minority jurors.114 The court focuses on whether there is
evidence to support the party’s reasons, no matter how reasonable these reasons may
be.115 In essence, credibility is measured by how reasonable, or how improbable, the
attorney’s explanations are, and by whether the proffered reason has some basis in
accepted trial strategy.116 Moreover, evaluation of the striking party’s state of mind based
on credibility “lie peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.”117 To this the California
Supreme Court has added the provision that, even though an appellate court can make a
comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal to determine whether the stated
reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge were pretextual, the appellate court must
give great deference to the trial court’s ultimate finding of no discriminatory intent.118
V. THE LESSONS OF HERNANDEZ IN JURY SELECTION
A. A Study of California Case Law
The recent Hernandez cases decided by California state and federal courts
demonstrate that the pretext analysis remains arbitrary and perilous in practice, as judges
try to peer into the hearts of striking parties to divine their true motivations for exercising
peremptory challenges. These authorities reveal the reluctance of the appellate courts to
disturb or question lower court determinations, and their willingness to accept

108

See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 352.
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768.
110
McClain, 217 F.3d at 1220.
111
Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171.
112
See People v. Hamilton, 200 P.3d 898, 925 (Cal. 2009) (party must communicate to the trial court any
dissatisfaction with the jury selected to preserve the issue for appeal).
113
Lenix, 187 P.3d at 954.
114
Id. at 956, 958.
115
Id.
116
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 359 (2003).
117
Lenix, 187 P.3d at 955.
118
Id.
109
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implausible race-neutral explanations despite substantial evidence to the contrary.119 Only
in truly egregious circumstances have courts been willing to grant Batson relief.
In People v. Cardenas,120 a Latino defendant argued to the California Court of
Appeal that the trial court had erred in overruling his Batson objection. The prosecution
had used peremptory challenges to strike two Latino venire persons, Jurors A and B.121
The prosecution’s proffered justification for the strikes was that she distrusted both
jurors’ ability to disregard direct testimony in Spanish and follow only the English
translation of the court interpreter.122 Although the trial judge “admonished” or warned
both potential jurors and asked them to follow only the English translation—which both
jurors agreed to do—the trial judge ultimately accepted the prosecutor’s “race-neutral”
explanation for disqualifying both Latino venire persons.123
The Court of Appeal admitted that evidence existed in the record that could
“arguably support” a finding that the prosecutor was “insincere in her proffered reasons
for excusing Jurors A and B.”124 First, the prosecutor’s “purported doubt” that the jurors
would follow the interpreter’s translation, even after the trial court’s firm admonition that
they must do so, “contradicts one of the basic tenets of our system of trial by jury which
is frequently cited by attorneys for the People—the presumption that jurors ‘generally
understand and faithfully follow instructions.’”125 Second, in Hernandez, the prosecutor
based his peremptory challenges on “the specific responses and the demeanor” of the two
multilingual jurors.126 In Cardenas, however, the prosecutor did not cite any specific
aspect of the jurors’ demeanor that led her to doubt the credibility of their promise to
follow the trial court’s instruction.127 Lastly, the fact that the prosecutor did not bother to
question another Latino venire person, Juror F, about his ability to accept the translations
provided in court was acknowledged as “some albeit . . . slight, evidence of the
prosecutor’s intent to discriminate against Hispanics.”128
The Court of Appeal, however, pointed out that a finding of “substantial evidence”
does not necessarily imply that there is “no contrary evidence” that would shield the
prosecution.129 Nonetheless, it failed to discuss any of this “contrary evidence.” Because
119

The Ninth Circuit defines substantial evidence as “more than a mere scintilla . . . but less than a
preponderance,” which means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183 (9th Cir. 1990). The California Supreme
Court defines substantial evidence as “evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” People
v. Ceja, 847 P.2d 55, 58 (Cal. 1993).
120
People v. Cardenas, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821 (2nd Dist. 2007).
121
Id. at 824.
122
Id. at 826.
123
Id. at 824.
124
Id. at 827.
125
Id. at 828.
126
Id.
127
Cardenas, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 828. Although the court did not explain why this was evidence of the
prosecutor’s insincerity, it probably viewed the prosecution’s failure to cite any specific aspects of the
juror’s demeanor as evidence that the prosecution did not have any real basis for striking the juror during
voir dire.
128
See id. Likewise, the court did not explain why this was evidence of the prosecutor’s insincerity.
However, the court probably viewed the prosecution’s failure to ask the juror about his ability to accept
English translations—and then excusing the juror on that basis—as evidence of the prosecution’s
discriminatory intent. See subpart VI(B) for more on a party’s failure to pursue further questioning.
129
Id.
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the trial court had concluded that the prosecution had put forth a “valid, race-neutral
reason” for excluding Jurors A and B, and that this was the prosecutor’s “true reason,”
the Court of Appeal held that the peremptory challenges were not a mere pretext to cover
up intentional discrimination against Latinos.130 On the strength of these observations, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the Batson challenge.
Cardenas exemplifies many of the difficulties with the pretext analysis. The
striking party’s threshold of proof for offering race-neutral explanations is so low that
plausible, run-of-the-mill justifications can be readily found or manufactured for striking
almost any juror in almost any case. How is a trial court supposed to judge those
justifications proffered by the prosecution? How is a judge supposed to read a
prosecutor’s mind? How is an appellate court supposed to analyze the trial court’s
credibility findings? How much deference should it accord to lower courts? How much is
too much deference? As Cardenas demonstrates, the problems of analysis and
implementation may be intractable even where the reasons proffered for exclusion are
plainly unsound, undermined by “substantial evidence” of discriminatory intent, and
acknowledged by the appellate court as such.
Indeed, the implication supported by cases like Cardenas is that to survive a Batson
challenge, the striking party need only say something that does not contain the word
“race” and describes a lack of confidence in a given juror’s ability to ignore non-English
testimony. In this environment, trial and appellate courts are hard-pressed to deem any
peremptory challenge based on language classifications as a pretext for race-based
exclusion, despite the pattern of strikes and other outward indicia131 of discrimination.
In another case, Corona v. Almager,132 the Ninth Circuit addressed a deeply
troubling Batson challenge. At Corona’s state court trial for attempted murder, the
prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to strike the only two black venire persons.
When the defendant raised Batson objections, the prosecutor stated that the primary
reason he struck one of the jurors, Juror 28, was that the “juror had a strong accent [from
which] the prosecutor inferred a lack of English proficiency.”133 Ironically, the trial judge
was the “first to advance [the view] that juror 28’s accent was a reason to exercise a
peremptory strike,”134 suggesting that the court was itself biased against the juror.
Meanwhile, the prosecutor conducted no further inquiry into Juror 28’s language ability
and “failed to ask follow-up questions.”135
The Ninth Circuit upheld the denial of Corona’s Batson motion, citing the
“considerable difficulty” the court and prosecutor had with the juror’s accent.136 Yet, the
District Court record “supports the opposite inference—that the [juror] was proficient in
English.”137 The juror read and answered questions perfectly in English.138 He spoke in
130

Id.
See discussion supra subpart IV(B) and infra subpart VI(B), for examples of outward indicia and
patterns of strikes that may establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
132
Corona v. Almager, 449 F. App’x 672 (9th Cir. 2011).
133
Id. at 674.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Corona v. Almager, No. CIV. 07-2117 BTM (NLS), 2008 WL 6926574, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3,
2008).
138
Id.
131
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open court using grammatically correct English, thereby strongly suggesting that “he
spoke English proficiently, albeit with an accent.”139 There were no questions from the
court reporter to signal an issue with the juror’s English,140 and “[n]either the prosecutor
nor anyone else asked any questions [regarding the juror’s] . . . ability to speak and
understand English.”141 Simply put, there are “no objective, factual grounds in the record
which support the . . . conclusion that the prosecutor’s strike appropriately rested on [the
juror’s] inability to speak or understand English sufficiently.”142 Nonetheless, the Ninth
Circuit failed to acknowledge any of these points in its decision and simply concluded
that nothing in the record “show[ed] that the trial court . . . ‘acted contrary to clearly
established [Supreme Court] law in recognizing and applying Batson’s [framework].’”143
With its decision in Corona, the Ninth Circuit afforded great deference to the state
court despite substantial evidence showing the unreasonableness of the proffered reason
for the peremptory strike. If the Ninth Circuit’s decision is accepted at face value,
prosecutors will be permitted to strike any minority juror who speaks English with an
accent—irrespective of whether the accent causes actual difficulty in understanding the
juror’s speech. A fair reading of Corona is that the Ninth Circuit took largely on faith that
the state court had gotten it right and, in the absence of egregious proof of discrimination,
essentially swept aside troubling aspects of the issue presented by the District Court.144
Such fact patterns are common in California case law. In People v. Jurado,145 the
prosecutor challenged the juror’s language ability because the juror indicated that she was
born in the Philippines, suggesting that English was not her first language and that she
would have difficulty understanding spoken English. In People v. Vargas,146 the Court of
Appeals affirmed a lower court’s denial of a Batson objection by a Latino defendant,
where the prosecutor used a peremptory strike based on the juror’s ability to speak
Spanish, even though the juror believed his English was good enough to fully engage in
deliberations. In Vasquez v. Runnels,147 juror Liang possessed a level of proficiency in
English sufficient to allow her to participate on the jury. However, the District Court 148
held that trial courts have great leeway in deciding these issues and, as such, it could not
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Id.
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Corona, 449 F. App’x 672 (citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002)).
144
Another example of a case exhibiting egregious proof of discrimination is U.S. v. Burton, 191 F.3d 461
(9th Cir. 1999). In this unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision finding a
prima facie showing of discrimination in the peremptory challenge directed against a Latino venire person.
According to the court, there was “no indication in the record [to suggest] that [the juror] was having
difficulty understanding or answering [in English] the questions posed to her, either orally or in writing.”
Id. at *1. Further, the striking party revealed a clear bias against Latinos in its earlier challenge by claiming
that “people who are Spanish-speakers or Hispanic . . . no matter how clear they are, they generally don’t
understand legal concepts of the law.” Id.
145
131 P.3d 400 (Cal. 2006).
146
No. B207146, 2010 WL 119930 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2010), cert. denied (2010).
147
No. C 05–4669 MMC PR, 2011 WL 1496040 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2011).
148
Petitioner challenged in District Court the validity of a judgment obtained against him in California state
court.
140

253

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2013

say whether the state court was unreasonable in allowing juror Liang’s exclusion or
whether it violated petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights.149
These California decisions reveal the potential arbitrariness of decisions concerning
challenges based on language proficiency. They illustrate that the practice allows courts
to accept implausible “race-neutral” explanations for challenges that, in reality, highly
correlate with race. These decisions also show that the Batson standard is a perilous
instrument that can be turned into “a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis” for
disqualifying linguistic minorities.150
Meanwhile, courts rarely grant Batson relief and do so only in truly egregious
circumstances. In 2008, the California Court of Appeal, Third District, found such
circumstances in People v. Gonzales.151 During voir dire, the prosecutor exercised four
peremptory challenges on prospective jurors, all of whom had Latino surnames. The
defense contested two of these challenges—for jurors J.C. and F.R.—compelling the
prosecutor to give reasons for their disqualification.152 According to the prosecutor, the
fact that they were “Spanish speaking” posed the risk that the jurors would ignore the
official court translation.153 He added that juror J.C.’s youth, as expressed through the
absence of marital and parental relationships, suggested that he had insufficient maturity
to serve as a juror.154
The Court of Appeal looked to the fact that the prosecutor failed to individually
question any of the Latino jurors to determine their ability to accept only the interpreter’s
translation of Spanish testimony.155 Indeed, there was nothing on the record to show that
J.C. or F.R. would have problems accepting the interpreter’s English translation.156 The
court observed that: (1) Spanish proficiency was not a race-neutral reason for excluding
jurors J.C. and F.R;157 (2) the prosecution was, in effect, eliminating the “clearly Hispanic
Spanish-speaking prospective jurors” who more closely identified with their ethnicity or
national origin, and; (3) the prosecution offered no other reason that might have provided
a race-neutral justification for challenging J.C. and F.R.158 There was also nothing on the
record to support the prosecutor’s claim that J.C.’s youth prevented him from serving
effectively as a juror.159 On these grounds, the appellate court denied the challenges
against J.C. and F.R., concluding that the strikes amounted to nothing more than
“stereotypical assumptions about Latinos or bilinguals.”160

149

Although both parties ultimately passed the juror for cause and not peremptorily, this case aptly
illustrates appellate courts’ reluctance to disturb lower court decisions, and courts’ willingness to accept
implausible race-neutral, language–proficiency explanations despite substantial evidence to the contrary.
150
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005).
151
81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 205 (3d. Dist. 2008).
152
Id.
153
Id. at 208.
154
Id. at 213.
155
Id. at 212.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 211 (agreeing with defendant that Spanish proficiency was not a race-neutral reason for excluding
jurors J.C. and F.R.; because the exclusion of both jurors raised the same issues, the court only analyzed
J.C.’s case).
158
Id. at 211–12.
159
Id. at 213.
160
Id. at 211 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 361).
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An interesting question that arises from the cases discussed above is whether the
Gonzales court would have allowed the peremptory challenges if the prosecutor had
questioned both jurors individually and they had answered that they would accept only
the English translation. In Cardenas, the challenges were deemed acceptable largely on
the assumption that the presence of such a question could be taken as an indicator of the
prosecutor’s “true” motivations, irrespective of the answer that the prosecutor received.161
This issue never arose in Gonzales. However, the unanswered question of whether the
Gonzales court would have followed Cardenas and allowed the peremptory challenges,
had the prosecutor asked the jurors about the translation question, renders Gonzales a
somewhat hollow victory for those who want Batson relief applied to viably protect
linguistic minority jurors’ rights.
B. Case Law Findings: Batson’s Failure, Untempered Judicial Discretion, and
Implausible Race-Neutral Explanations
Despite occasional successes like Gonzales, the arbitrariness of the Batson analysis
with respect to multilingual prospective jurors continues to plague objecting parties who
bear the unusual burden of proving the striking party’s discriminatory state of mind.
Indeed, proving states of mind is at best an elusive goal, yet in this context such a goal
might be said to border on the impossible because discrimination—whether on the part of
striking parties or of judges presiding over voir dire—may be either “conscious or
unconscious.”162 Currently, moreover, striking parties need only provide “race-neutral”
explanations, or explanations that are based on something other than race, to justify
striking multilinguals.163 Indeed, the threshold has been so low in practice that striking
parties can meet their burden of proof by offering almost any explanation.
Trial judges must rely on credibility determinations where these explanations are
concerned.164 Since they only have direct access to facts and statements, not mental
states, trial judges must divine the truth or “genuineness”165 of the reasons proffered,
which renders them “ill equipped to second-guess”166 what appears to be facially neutral
reasons to uncover discrimination. Indeed, the Supreme Court has admitted that there
161

See Cardenas, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 824, 826, 828.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 106. The distinction between “conscious” and “unconscious” bias is helpful to the
extent it reveals that unconscious bias warrants attention because it poses a unique challenge for
antidiscrimination doctrine and advocacy. The distinction is also helpful because people may be willing to
acknowledge the possibility of unconscious bias within themselves, while vigorously denying conscious
bias. The unconscious bias claim therefore facilitates a consensus that the race problem persists. See e.g.,
Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics,
and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2009); see also Jean Moule, UNDERSTANDING UNCONSCIOUS
BIAS AND UNINTENTIONAL RACISM, available at
http://people.uncw.edu/browna/documents/UnderstandingUnconsciousBiasUnintentionalRacism.pdf.
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that “bias both conscious and unconscious, reflecting
traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up barriers that must come down if equal opportunity
and nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become this country’s law and practice.” Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 300–01 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
163
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 353.
164
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 324 (credibility can be measured by “how reasonable, or how improbable, the
explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy”).
165
See Lenix, 187 P.3d at 965.
166
Batson, 476 U.S. at 106.
162
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“will seldom be much evidence bearing on the issue [of discrimination] and that the best
evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.”167
Studies, however, have shown that determining neutrality or credibility based on
demeanor is susceptible to great inaccuracies,168 and a party can easily present false but
neutral reasons while putting forward an honest and proper demeanor.
The fact that the race-neutral test relies on subjective criteria—the judge’s beliefs
regarding the intent or mental state of the striking party—makes it all the more difficult
to reach an objective result in which illegitimate forms of peremptory challenges are
properly and consistently identified and rejected. Moreover, in states like California,
where trial courts have substantial discretion in evaluating Batson issues because of the
great deference accorded to them by reviewing courts,169 both trial and appellate courts
become reluctant to make the stark findings of attorney misconduct necessary to declare a
Batson violation.170
The Supreme Court, meanwhile, has only compounded the problem. In Johnson,171
where the court established the “reasonable inference standard,” the Court failed to
explain what it meant by an acceptable inference of discrimination, leaving California
with scarcely any guidance as to the type of evidence that would comport with its
holding. Instead, California state courts escape constitutional scrutiny simply by using the
same verbiage found in Johnson. They pepper their decisions generously with the term
“race neutral,” but apply such language according to their own interpretation, allowing
their opinions ultimately to comport with the Batson standard without actually changing
their analysis post-Johnson.
The confusion wrought by Batson and its progeny has generated substantial
literature on peremptory challenges. Some scholars conclude that eliminating peremptory
challenges is the ideal response because it would not only prevent discrimination against
minorities in jury selection, but would also alleviate the confusion cultivated by the
complex Batson case law.172 These scholars suggest that any value gained by allowing
167

Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365.
See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075, 1082–88 (1991) (empirical
evidence shows that demeanor can diminish rather than enhance the accuracy of credibility judgments).
169
Lenix, 187 P.3d at 955.
170
See People v. Jackson, 13 Cal. 4th 1164, 1250–51 (1996) (“The tendency of trial courts to deal
perfunctorily with [Batson/Wheeler] motions may be understandable, given the press of the court’s
business, but it also further underscores the importance of appellate review [because] ‘[e]ven the most
conscientious trial judge can be misled by such extraneous pressures as a reluctance to dismiss the venire
after some or all of the jurors have been seated, or a felt urgency to begin taking testimony in a trial
expected to be lengthy, or a natural disinclination to disbelieve assertions of good faith made by an attorney
in open court.’”) (citing People v. Johnson, 767 P.2d 1047, 1105 (1989)).
171
Johnson, 545 U.S. 162.
172
See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned about Batson and Peremptory
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 502 (1996) (based on his empirical study of court cases, Melilli
concludes that peremptory challenges no longer serve a useful purpose); see also Morris. B. Hoffman,
Peremptory Challenges Should be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809 (1997);
Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory
Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099 (1994); Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge
Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992); Marvin B. Steinberg, The Case for Eliminating
Peremptory Challenges, 27 CRIM. L. BULL. 216 (1991); Brent J.
Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
227 (1986).
168
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peremptory challenges to give effect to attorneys’ hunches, suspicions, or arbitrary
predilections is promptly overridden because such a system can be—and, in fact, is—
easily manipulated to exclude minorities and other disfavored groups from jury
service.173
Advocates of peremptory challenges, on the other hand, could point to studies
showing a strong correlation between a minority juror’s race and his or her decision not
to convict, although other studies show an equally strong but opposite correlation.174
Advocates posit that peremptory challenges provide “tangible” security by allowing
attorneys to excuse jurors whom they believe—but cannot offer evidence to prove—are
biased.175 They argue that peremptory challenges ultimately lead to fairer juries and
reassure litigants that they have a say as to who judges them.176 These advocates also
suggest other benefits to peremptory challenges, that is, that they prevent the
unpleasantness of articulating concerns about juror bias and that they enable attorneys to
swiftly remove jurors whom they have alienated through probing questions during voir
dire.177
Other scholars have compiled evidence to suggest that the effects of juror race are
context–dependent, with juror attitudes and experiences serving as more powerful
predictors of juror verdicts.178 Indeed, related research supports the view that giving force
to stereotypes or hunches not only fails to produce less biased juries, it also results in
juries that are more biased than randomly selected ones.179 In other words, striking
173

See supra text accompanying note 168.
Compare Mark D. Bradbury & Marian R. Williams, Diversity and Citizen Participation: The Effect of
Race on Juror Decision Making, 44 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 1, 13 (2012) (arguing that Latino jurors are more
likely to convict) with Stephen P. Garvey, et al., Juror First Votes in Criminal Trials, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 372, 382 (2004) (arguing that Latino jurors are less likely to convict than white jurors, but the
difference between the two groups fails to reach statistical significance); see also Richard Seltzer, Scientific
Jury Selection: Does it Work?, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2417, 2419 (2006) (noting that in one
pornography case, there was a strong relationship between race and juror attitudes toward conviction, but in
a similar case in a different jurisdiction, there was an equally strong relationship between these two
variables in the opposite direction).
175
See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, Jury Selection, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 39, 63
(1982).
176
See id. (“Babcock argues that the peremptory challenge serves the valuable function of allowing
defendants some additional choice in the jury that will decide their fate, a choice unfettered by the
requirements of legal tests or rationales for exclusion.”).
177
Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power,” 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 554–55
(1975).
178
See Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, The Jury in Practice: Avoid Bald Men and People with Green
Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1180
(2003); see also Tanya S. Taylor & Harmon M. Hosch, An Examination of Jury Verdicts for Evidence of a
Similarity-Leniency Effect, An Out-Group Punitiveness Effect, or a Black Sheep Effect, 28 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 587, 597 (2004); Norbert L. Kerr et al., Defendant-Juror Similarity and Mock Juror Judgments, 19
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 545, 546-48 (1995).
179
Cathy Johnson & Craig Haney, Felony Voir Dire: An Exploratory Study of Its Content and Effect, 18
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 487, 498 (1994) (arguing that striking jurors based on stereotypes or hunches fails to
produce a less biased jury, but results in juries that are worse than or, at best, similar to a random selection);
see also Shari Seidman Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Jury, 54 BUFF. L. REV.
717, 737 (2006) (demographic characteristics like race generally account for very little of the variation in
verdict response); EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING THE DAMAGES: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF JURY AWARDS 87 (2003) (as in the criminal context, jurors’ characteristics have little to no effect in the
civil context); Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
174
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potential jurors based on stereotypes produces a homogenous jury that denies a defendant
a right to an impartial jury. All in all, by far the strongest indicator of juror verdicts is
likely to be the evidence presented at trial.180 Nonetheless, the weight of tradition behind
them and the reassurance that they provide to litigants probably mean that peremptory
challenges will remain a fixture in jury selection. This likelihood poses an important
challenge for California and for other state courts.181 After all, if existing doctrine and
practice remain unchanged, Batson will continue to allow reliance on language as a
pretext for race in jury selection, thereby disenfranchising racial and linguistic minorities,
and undermining public perception of integrity in the judicial process.
C. Ineffective California Laws that Heighten Hernandez’s Effect
California’s constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, prohibits the use of peremptory
challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race and declares the right of
defendants to a trial by jury drawn from a representative cross section of the
community.182 In practice, however, California state laws have not provided linguistic
minorities with any greater or more meaningful protection than have federal laws in
attempting to prevent discriminatory jury selection practices. While California’s venire
selection mechanisms183 and Penal Code184 were amended to protect “representational
due process values,”185 exclusion of multilinguals from jury service because of imagined
language issues raises Sixth Amendment concerns, which these laws were meant to stay.
In other words, while venire mechanisms and the Penal Code were amended to protect
Sixth Amendment guarantees that allow an accused to “enjoy . . . a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury,”186 California has failed in this objective by allowing
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 673 (2001) (few if any juror characteristics are
good predictors of jury verdict preferences and those characteristics that are related to juror verdict
preferences have weak and inconsistent effects); REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON,
INSIDE THE JURY 149 (1983) (the relationship between demographic characteristics, such as race, and
verdict preferences is weak).
180
See Christy A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1,
13–14 (1987).
181
U.S. Supreme Court opinions suggest that though there are problems with peremptory challenges, they
are ultimately fair because the strikes of one party will always be offset or canceled out by the strikes of the
second party. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 159 (1994) (In his dissent, Justice Scalia
declares that “[t]his case is a perfect example of how the system as a whole is evenhanded” in its treatment
of peremptories and other legal tools.).
182
See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all . . .”); CAL.
PENAL CODE Section 904.6(e) (West 2012); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 755 (Cal. 1978) (citing
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)) (“For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury
service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it, but is
at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.”), overruled on
other grounds by Johnson, 545 U.S. 162.
183
See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all . . .”).
184
CAL. PENAL CODE § 904.6(e) (West 2012).
185
Hobby v. U.S., 468 U.S. 339, 346 (1984).
186
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). The California Supreme Court has also recognized the value
of the representative cross section requirement via impartial juries. See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748,
762 (Cal. 1978), (“[T]he primary purpose of the representative cross section requirement . . . is to achieve
an overall impartiality by allowing the interaction of the diverse beliefs and values the jurors bring from
their group experiences.” When racial minorities are underrepresented on jury venires, “such interaction
becomes impossible and the jury will be dominated by the conscious or unconscious prejudices of the
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Hernandez-based challenges to overwhelm its constitution, leading to the de facto
restriction of jury service to monolinguals, who represent little more than half of
California’s total population.187
Indeed, disqualifying multilingual jurors based on language classifications violates
state laws by producing juries that do not adequately reflect a broad or “representative
cross section of the population.”188 These exclusions further violate a defendant’s right to
a fair hearing because juries should be made up of one’s peers, and this point is
particularly salient in light of the fact that most defendants are not monolinguals.
Ultimately, such exclusions not only result in the infringement of personal or
constitutional189 rights, but they also deny multilinguals the opportunity to participate in a
vital aspect of civic life.
While California’s venire laws have failed to protect multilinguals’ right to jury
service, California’s “English Only” laws have reduced multilinguals’ participation in
jury service by imposing an arbitrary standard that allows only those who speak English
“sufficiently” well to participate in jury service.190 Overall, these laws have worked in
concert to heighten the impact of Hernandez on multilinguals. Since Hernandez allows
even those multilinguals who are fluent in English to be excluded on the basis of their
multilingualism, the already-small pool of multilingual potential jurors is further
diminished.191 All of these laws, consequently, reinforce each other and combine to
facilitate the systematic exclusion of multilinguals from jury service.
In light of the negative impact of Hernandez and the rest of California’s
discriminatory framework on linguistic minorities, and the remote prospect of abolishing
peremptory challenges, it is clear that there is a pressing need for special measures to
protect multilinguals’ right to jury service and to encourage greater diversity in jury
venires.192
D. The Importance of Diverse Juries
Jury diversity is especially salient in light of the fact that most U.S. jurisdictions
today are both racially and linguistically heterogeneous. A diverse jury enhances the
quality of deliberations by bringing together a range of perspectives to test the evidence
and arguments in the case. A jury verdict, moreover, should reflect the community’s
majority.”); see also People v. Bell, 778 P.2d 129, 167 (Cal. 1989) (Broussard, J., dissenting) (“[T]he only
practical way to achieve an overall impartiality is to encourage the representation of . . . a variety of [racial]
groups on the jury so that the respective biases of their members, to the extent they are antagonistic, will
tend to cancel each other out.”).
187
See Shin et al., supra note 3, at 8–10 (monolinguals represent 57% of California’s total population).
188
CAL. PENAL CODE § 904.6(e) (West 2012); see also supra text accompanying note 181.
189
This paper will not revisit these constitutional issues, which have already been discussed by other
authors. See H. Swift, The Unconventional Equal Protection Jurisprudence of Jury Selection, 16 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 295 (1996) (describing Hernandez as an indication that the Court has prioritized the peremptory
challenge over the Equal Protection Clause); Andrew P. Averbach, Language Classifications and the Equal
Protection Clause: When is Language a Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481 (1994)
(suggesting a way for the Equal Protection Clause to protect linguistic minorities); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21
(1993) (describing Hernandez as diluting the line of Batson protections).
190
See Part III of this paper for a discussion of California’s “English Only” laws.
191
See supra text accompanying note 72.
192
See Part VI for suggested measures.
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conscience if it is to be legitimate in the eyes of the community, and both the perceived
and real accuracy of this reflection are enhanced to the extent that the decision makers are
drawn from a fair cross section of that community.193
Striking linguistic minorities from a jury because they are more likely to
understand the witnesses’ original testimony arguably excludes the very people who will
be able to understand the testimony most accurately and undermines the system’s
ultimate goal of justice. After all, linguistic minorities’ ability to help correct translation
errors and distortions can positively contribute to the truth-seeking function of a jury trial.
Such exclusions, moreover, can harm linguistic minorities’ perceptions of the justice
system, threatening their belief in its fairness and influencing others in the community to
lose confidence in a system that tolerates discriminatory exclusions.194
Allowing the exclusion of any potential juror on the grounds that he or she will
bring the biases of a particular racial group into the jury room is to misunderstand the
democratic task of the jury, which is precisely to represent the diversity of views held in a
heterogeneous society. If the jury is balanced to accomplish this representative task, then
as a whole it will be impartial, even if no one juror is perfectly so. Linguistic minorities’
participation in juries is especially important because their viewpoints can help stimulate
discourse that might otherwise not be explored, even if the ideas considered are not
ultimately accepted by the group. Although the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth
Amendment’s fair cross section requirement does not extend to potential jurors’
viewpoints,195 empirical studies have shown that racially diverse juries are better decision
makers than all-white juries: they exchange a wider range of information; demonstrate
more complex thinking; are less biased, more thorough, and more competent; devote
more time to discussing and resolving polarizing or uncomfortable topics; discuss more
trial evidence; and, make fewer factually inaccurate statements in discussing the evidence
than do all-white juries.196 In adding new perspectives, linguistic minorities thus
contribute to a framework in which jury decisions are qualitatively better, even when
these decisions are not actually different from what they otherwise might have been.
Thus, minority participation is a valuable component in the interpretive process, and the
participation of linguistic minority jurors encourages balance and impartiality during
deliberations.
Diverse juries also promote a positive social good that may go beyond the
courtroom given that participants share their experiences and the products of their
education during deliberations, which enables individuals of diverse backgrounds to learn
to work together as equals.197 Within the judicial process, diverse juries positively
influence the performance of attorneys, including their voir dire strategies, trial
preparations, and presentations.198 Above all, diverse juries embody the ideals enshrined
193

See supra text accompanying note 181 for a discussion of the cross section requirement.
See Powers, 499 U.S. at 406–09, 411 (recognizing that the jury and even the entire community may lose
confidence in a justice system that tolerates discriminatory exclusions).
195
See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986).
196
Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of
Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 598, 600, 606–08
(2006).
197
HIROSHI FUKURAI & RICHARD KROOTH, RACE IN THE JURY BOX: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN JURY
SELECTION 16 (2003).
198
Id.
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in both the U.S. and the California constitutions and must, therefore, be protected and
ensured.
VI. IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA FRAMEWORK
A. Recommendations to Judges, Courts, and Litigating Parties
Improving the application of California’s pretext analysis is necessary and requires
that courts and litigants bear the following considerations in mind. From a trial judge’s
standpoint, perhaps the most obvious remedy is meaningful judicial oversight of the jury
selection process. A trial judge could ensure that several information-gathering tools are
used in voir dire, including individualized and collective questioning of prospective
jurors, written questionnaires to supplement oral voir dire, meaningful co-participation of
judge and lawyer in questioning prospective jurors, and adequate time for parties and the
court to implement such practices. In cases where voir dire is less dominated by the trial
judge, the judge should still include an opportunity to ask at least a few individualized
questions of potential jurors, all the while subjecting the attorneys to meaningful judicial
oversight. Such practices can ultimately help the trial court assess whether the proffered
“race-neutral” explanations for striking a given juror were a pretext for language-based
racism.199
When a trial judge decides a peremptory-related matter, he or she should be vigilant
when applying each of the three steps of the Batson test, and should ensure that each step
is properly and carefully considered and supported by the record. Because reviewing
courts look to trial records when adjudicating Batson appeals, defects or a lack of
evidence in the record could be a basis for remand. A trial judge should, therefore,
include on the record both the reasons for the decision and any circumstances that were
crucial to the determination. Moreover, a trial judge should neither rely on generalities
nor resolve peremptory objections summarily, but should develop a record that clearly
outlines the findings with respect to each Batson step so that an appellate court will be in
a position to evaluate intelligently the soundness of the trial judge’s decision.
For their part, appellate courts should not confer undue deference to trial courts in
their review procedures. Because a meaningful multi-judge review is part of California’s
design for deciding appeals involving its citizens and laws, the first step is to recognize
that the rule of deference has important limits if California is to improve its application of
the pretext analysis. Appellate courts should not invoke the rule of deference to avoid
close analysis of difficult questions. Instead, they must carefully and thoroughly review
the lower court’s decision along with its record and offer clear reasons and guidelines in
stating their own opinions. After all, it is only from appellate opinions that trial judges
learn the boundaries of their discretionary power.
Indeed, the California opinions discussed in this article illustrate the fact that
appellate courts have fallen far short of satisfactorily defining or clarifying the notion of
abuse of discretion. This would not be the case if appellate courts crafted guidelines that
199

Of course, with more information, an attorney is better prepared to offer a reason that sounds nonpretextual. Indeed, certain voir dire techniques, such as sequestration of individual potential jurors, can
provide more complete disclosures from jurors that could be used to justify striking the juror. See, e.g.,
Shari Seidman Diamond, et al., Realistic Responses to the Limitations of Batson v. Kentucky, 7 CORNELL J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 77 (1998).
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could adequately prevent the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. For example,
appellate courts should start by recognizing that trial courts rely heavily on assessments
of a striking party’s motivations when deciding Batson challenges. In response, appellate
courts should require judges to specify the basis of their “motivational judgments,” and
they could enforce this requirement by refusing to defer to the findings of lower courts
that neglect to do so.200 In fact, appellate courts would likely become more sensitive to
the need for abuse-of-discretion guidelines if they sat regularly as trial judges,201 for it
would remind them that records often fail to convey important factors upon which cases
should be decided. Ultimately, the rule of discretion need not contribute to discrimination
against linguistic minorities if those who confer and review its application understand and
remain sensitive to the dangers that it carries.
In turn, striking parties should be required to articulate plausible, race-neutral, and
specific reasons for each peremptory strike. If this were the case, and if review were more
thorough and less deferential than at present, striking parties would be forced to accept
the fact that they would be better served by assessing the attitudes and experiences of
multilingual jurors than by making assumptions—or pursuing “hunches”—based simply
on language or race. Objecting parties, for their part, must raise a timely Batson challenge
by objecting during voir dire or before the swearing of the venire panel.202 The objecting
party must also clearly specify the grounds for the objection. Failure to do so—either
because the objection was general or because it specified a different ground than that
raised on appeal—will neither weaken the peremptory strike nor preserve the issue for
appellate review. Most importantly, the objecting party must pay close attention to the
first step, or the prima facie prong, of the Batson analysis and support the objection by
presenting evidence that is supported by the factual record.203

200

Although this measure would be an exception to the usual deference granted to trial courts on
credibility-related judgments, it would address many of the issues discussed in subparts V(A) and (B) of
this paper. However, in a recent decision, Ayala v. Wong, the Ninth Circuit held that an appellate court
“cannot defer to the trial court where procedural error . . . has rendered the trial court’s determination
unreliable.” 693 F.3d 945, 972 (2012) (Defendant’s counsel was mistakenly excluded from Batson
proceedings, thereby depriving him of the opportunity to persuade the trial judge that the prosecutor was
motivated by racial bias. The trial court also lost the vast majority of juror questionnaires, preventing the
appellate court from engaging in proper comparative juror analysis.).
201
While appellate judges may be reluctant to consider this suggestion because it would require more of
their time, places like Mississippi have successfully implemented this measure. Mississippi allows
appellate judges to pursue trial judge duties in an effort to save the state money, and appellate judges have
appreciated this move since it would help them become “better” at their jobs by keeping them “in touch
with reality.”
Court of Appeals Judges Sit As Special Trial Judges, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI JUDICIARY,
http://courts.ms.gov/news/2005/01.06.05specialappt.pdf.
202
See, e.g., U.S. v. Changco, 1 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1993) (admitting the defense presents “significant
arguments” to establish a prima facie case of language discrimination, but denying these objections because
they were neither raised in a timely manner, nor supported by a factual record); Guillen v. Scribner, No.
CV 05-4519 VBF (JC), 2010 WL 2509416, at *27 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2010) (dismissing defense’s
objections to the peremptory challenge because of “Batson’s inherent timeliness requirement”).
203
See, e.g., Changco, 1 F.3d at 841 (stating that objections to peremptory challenges should be supported
by the factual record).
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B. Recommendations for Developing the Factual Record
This section presents recommendations for strategies that objecting parties should
employ to show objective evidence that a prima facie case for discrimination exists.
These strategies are recommended because their use increases the likelihood that the
objecting party can overcome the striking party’s race-neutral explanation and show
intent to discriminate under step three of the Batson analysis. However, as some of the
recommendations included in this section relate to strategies that have not yet been
formally recognized by California state or federal courts, this section should also be taken
as an appeal to these courts to do so as soon and as definitively as possible to establish a
more just and concrete framework within which parties can develop a factual record and
support discrimination claims.
First, California federal courts should follow state courts and the Eleventh
Circuit204 in allowing objecting parties to present, where relevant, evidence of a historical
pattern in which the striking party excused members of a particular group from the
prospective jury pool in other, unrelated cases.205 This does not mean that counsel can or
should be required to show that a striking party always excluded every member of a
cognizable group over any particular period of time,206 but that evidence of any such
pattern can contribute to a showing of intent on the part of the striking party to
disenfranchise members of the cognizable group. At the same time, it must be noted that
the California Supreme Court held that even if counsel successfully establishes the
striking party’s pattern of excusal of all members of a particular group, which raises an
inference of impropriety, it is not dispositive. In such instances, trial courts are expected
to evaluate the strikes in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding these strikes.207
Objecting parties should therefore be prepared to marshal other evidence that supports
their discrimination claims.
Second, the California Supreme Court should follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead and
allow state courts to consider comparative juror analysis as evidence for establishing step
one, or the prima facie prong, of the Batson test. Comparative juror analysis considers
whether the answers of challenged jurors were similar to, or different from, those of
jurors who went unchallenged.208 The results of such an analysis can support an inference
that differential treatment of individuals, if not based on different (individual) answers,
may derive from their membership in racial or minority groups. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
has conducted comparative juror analyses sua sponte in a variety of cases and, by
emphasizing the value of comparative evidence in preventing a court from unreasonably
accepting racial motives as nonracial, it has implied that lower courts should do the
same.209 As it stands, the California Supreme Court has limited the use of this analysis by
allowing state courts to consider such evidence only during the third step of the Batson
204

See the Eleventh Circuit apply the historical pattern test in Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1220 (11th
Cir. 1983).
205
See the California Supreme Court apply the historical pattern test in People v. Crittenden, 885 P.2d 887,
903 (Cal. 1994).
206
See id.
207
See id.
208
Johnson, 71 P.3d at 280–81, overruled by Johnson, 545 U.S. 162.
209
See Ali v. Hickman, 571 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 2009) amended by, 584 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2009);
Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 361 (9th Cir. 2006); Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir.
2006).
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inquiry.210 The Ninth Circuit, however, has argued that “[t]here is nothing that suggests
that it is more difficult or less desirable to engage in such analysis at step one rather than
step three of Batson.”211
Third, counsel in state or federal proceedings should raise the issue of statistical
disparities, with respect to the proportion of available minorities stricken from the venire,
the disproportionate rate of strikes against minorities, or both.212 Moreover, since
California courts have not specified the numerical data necessary to raise or support an
inference of discrimination, they should adopt the Second Circuit’s approach in this
regard. In its analysis, the Second Circuit differentiates the issues of challenge rate and
exclusion rate.213 The challenge rate focuses on the proportion of peremptory challenges
exercised against minority group members and the proportion of group members
removed, whereas the exclusion rate focuses on patterns where group members were
completely or almost completely excluded from the jury.
In practice, the challenge rate compares the “total peremptory strikes against
members of a cognizable racial group . . . to the percentage of that racial group in the
venire.”214 The exclusion rate records the disproportionate number of peremptory
challenges used to strike members of a cognizable racial group.215 The Second Circuit
believes that the “distinction between the two types of challenges is an important one”
because cases involving challenge rates are successful upon a finding of “substantial
statistical disparity,” while cases involving exclusion rates “have typically included
patterns in which members of the racial group are completely or almost completely
excluded from participating on the jury.”216
To establish a prima facie case, the Second Circuit has required a complete record
for both the challenge rate and exclusion rate.217 First, to establish a prima facie case
based on the challenge rate, “the record should include, at a minimum, the number of
peremptory challenges used against the racial group at issue, the number of peremptory
challenges used in total, and the percentage of the venire that belongs to that racial
group.”218 In United States v. Alvarado,219 the prosecution’s challenge rate against
minorities was 50% (three of six) in the selection of twelve jurors, and 57% (four of
210

Lenix, 187 P.3d at 950.
Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2006).
212
See People v. Neuman, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 719, 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Paulino v. Harrison, 542
F.3d 692, 703 (9th Cir. 2008); Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.3d 1073, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2002) (Prosecutor
disproportionately struck four of seven (57%) Latinos, supporting an inference of discrimination.
Prosecutor also struck the only two black venire members, which, standing alone, is not always enough to
establish a prima facie case. However, prosecutor’s prior use of peremptory challenges against Latino
venire members, taken together with subsequent strikes against the only two black venire members,
additionally supported inference of discrimination.); Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 813 (9th Cir.1995)
(finding prima facie case of discrimination to be established when the government uses 56% of its
peremptory challenges against black venire persons, although black venire persons comprise only 30% of
the venire population), overruled by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc).
213
See Jones v. West, 555 F.3d 90, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2009).
214
See id. at 98.
215
See id.
216
See id.
217
See Sorto v. Herbert, 497 F.3d 163, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2007).
218
See id; Jones, 555 F.3d at 98.
219
923 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1991).
211
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seven) in the selection of twelve jurors plus alternates.220 Because the court did not know
the percentage of minorities in the venire, it used as a proxy the percentage of minorities
in the population of the Eastern District of New York from which the venire was drawn
(29%).221 The court reached the conclusion that “a challenge rate nearly twice the likely
minority percentage of the venire strongly supports a prima facie case under Batson.”222
In United States v. Franklyn,223 the government used half of its peremptory challenges
against black potential jurors, who made up only one-eighth of the venire, establishing a
prima facie case of discrimination.
To establish a prima facie case based on the exclusion rate, “the record need only
include how many members of that group were in the venire, and how many of those
were struck.”224 In Jones v. West,225 the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike
four of five black venire members not already struck for cause, establishing a pattern of
prima facie case of discrimination. In Green v. Travis,226 though the court lacked precise
data about the composition of the venire, the prosecutor used all of his peremptory strikes
to remove black and Latino venire members and struck all black venire members not
already struck for cause, establishing a pattern of prima facie case of discrimination. In
Harris v. Kuhlmann,227 peremptory strikes that excluded all five black potential jurors
established a pattern of prima facie case of discrimination, while in Tankleff v.
Senkowski,228 peremptory strikes that excluded the only three black potential jurors
constituted a sufficiently dramatic pattern to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.
Counsel in state and federal proceedings should also keep in mind that jury
selection procedures may give rise to an inference of prejudice even if opposing counsel
does not actively strike potential jurors. Counsel should consider whether the trial court
might have allowed a jury shuffle that prevented a random selection of jurors. The jury
shuffle is a tool commonly used in Texas criminal trials to change the seating order for
the jury pool.229 Specifically, venire members’ names are reshuffled or rearranged, which
affects the order in which these members are seated and therefore reached for
questioning. The jury shuffle has been considered problematic 230 because once the order
is established, the panel members seated at the back are likely to escape voir dire
altogether, for those not questioned by the end of the week are dismissed.231 In essence,
the jury shuffle has been used as a tool to deliberately move racial minorities to the back
of the venire panel where they are less likely to be considered and selected. Indeed,
California’s own version of jury shuffling is already admissible as evidence of bias and
220

Id. at 255.
Id. at 255–56.
222
Id. at 255.
223
No. S1 96 CR. 1062 (DLC), 1997 WL 334969 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 1997) aff'd, 157 F.3d 90 (2d Cir.
1998).
224
See Jones, 555 F.3d at 99; Harris v. Kuhlmann, 346 F.3d 330, 345–46 (2d Cir. 2003).
225
555 F.3d 90.
226
414 F.3d 288 (2d Cir. 2005).
227
346 F.3d 330 (2d Cir. 2003).
228
135 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 1998).
229
See Blanton v. Quarterman, 543 F.3d 230, 242 (5th Cir. 2008).
230
William v. Dorsaneo III et al., TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE: TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE § 2.01(E)(1)
(2010) (discussing criticisms of the jury shuffle in racial contexts).
231
Id. at 242.
221
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procedural abuse.232 To the extent that a jury shuffle occurs in the venire selection
process and that counsel believes such a shuffle has defeated the random selection of
potential jurors, counsel should raise this procedural challenge. Courts should then
consider whether the departure from a random selection excluded linguistic minorities
from participating in voir dire.
Finally, state and federal courts should consider allowing evidence of a striking
party’s failure to pursue further questioning as a legitimate element in raising a prima
facie case of discrimination.233 Indeed, asking few or no follow-up questions regarding a
juror’s English proficiency and then excusing that juror on the basis of a perceived
“insufficiency” is, as common sense dictates, counterintuitive and may well raise an
inference that something else—namely, discrimination—is at work. However, courts may
be reluctant to pursue this line of reasoning because the striking party can always claim
that the decision to ask few or no follow-up questions was warranted based on the juror’s
questionnaire or existing voir dire answers, and that further questioning would have been
unnecessary or a waste of time. Therefore, it may be appropriate in practice to combine a
failure to pursue further questioning with one or more of the other types of evidence
discussed above, e.g.,: (1) a statistical disparity analysis, such as one in which the striking
party is shown to have removed the only remaining linguistic minority from the panel; or
(2) a comparative juror analysis that demonstrates that the responses of those jurors who
were excused were not substantially different from those of other jurors who were
allowed to serve. Such combined use can overcome the aforementioned objection and,
thus, allow this common and significant type of evidence to play a role in establishing an
overall case for discrimination.
C. Recommendations for the California Legislature
First, state legislators should reconsider California’s “Official English” laws. Sadly,
these laws have exacerbated the negative impact of Hernandez and resulted in the
232

See CAL. CIV. PROC. § 222(b) (West 2012) (court shall seat prospective jurors in random order); Woods
v. Scribner, No. 1:02CV05894-JKS, 2007 WL 852184, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2007) (court
acknowledges that “shuffling of juries to place white [jurors] ahead of black jurors” is evidence of pretext);
see also People v. Mayfield, 928 P.2d 485, 519 (1997) (Jury ordering or shuffling procedures that
unnecessarily narrow a jury pool are disfavored. Courts should, therefore, strictly adhere to statutory
provisions designed to provide defendants with juries constituting as nearly as reasonably possible a
random cross section of the community.); People v. Visciotti, 825 P.2d 388, 404–09 (1992) (Defendants
have a constitutional right to a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community. To show
that this right was violated, a defendant must demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to seat prospective
jurors randomly affected his or her ability to select a jury drawn from a representative cross section. In
other words, a defendant must show that the jury selection procedure prevented a random selection of
jurors and, thus, held the potential for abuse or appearance of partiality.); People v. Wright, 802 P.2d 221,
238–41 (1990) (Jury ordering or shuffling procedures used to select prospective jurors for voir dire do not
deny a defendant his right to a randomly selected jury if: (1) selection was not undertaken by a single
person, (2) there was no evidence that these prospective jurors were aware that the order in which they
entered the courtroom or were seated would determine whether they would be included in voir dire, and (3)
defense counsel was able to fully question them and exercise his peremptory challenges in an informed
manner).
233
Indeed, the Supreme Court has already recognized that “disparate questioning” of venire persons can
raise a reasonable inference of discrimination. See Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 234. People v. Gonzales,
discussed in subpart V(A) of this paper, also offers a good rationale for why a failure to pursue further
questioning should be considered in raising a prima facie case of discrimination.
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disenfranchisement of linguistic minorities from jury service. Indeed, it is ironic that,
although it is clearly and demonstrably the case that linguistic minorities are
underrepresented in jury service, obstacles are thrown in their path that effectively
prevent them from exercising their civic duty. Thus, California legislators should (1)
consider abolishing discriminatory Official English laws; and (2) allow state courts to
expand their existing infrastructure so that they can better accommodate linguistic
differences in the full spectrum of courtroom activity, including jury composition. For
example, under the California Rules of Court, Rule 985, which governs interpreter
services in the courts,234 the corps of courtroom interpreters could be expanded to
accommodate those jurors who, in the court’s view, do not possess “sufficient” English
skills. This accommodation could also be extended to non-English-speaking citizens.
Second, state legislators could consider allowing convicted felons to participate in
jury service.235 Convicted felons in California must be pardoned by the Governor to have
their civil rights restored so they can participate in jury service.236 However, not all felons
are eligible for pardon and237 even for those who are, state law mandates procedures that
make it extremely difficult for felons to shed their status.238 This is especially troubling

234

See e.g., CAL. JUD. ADMIN. R. 10.51 (West 2012).
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203(a)(5) (West 2012) (disqualifying from jury service those who have
been convicted of a felony). One common argument against including convicted felons as jurors is that they
are “inherently biased,” and allowing them on a criminal jury would deny a criminal defendant the right to
an impartial jury. Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 71
(2003). However, some scholars counter that defining felons as “inherently biased is inconsistent with
[court] decisions affirming verdicts rendered by juries with felons,” and that exclusions are often applied
over-inclusively in states that allow clemency felons to serve. Id. at 85. Based on a 2003 study, thirty-one
states exclude felons from serving on juries for life, unless their rights are restored pursuant to discretionary
clemency rules. Id. at 157. However, two states—Maine and Colorado—do not exclude convicted felons
from serving on juries. Id. at 158.
236
See California Courts: The Judicial Branch, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/3953.htm#felon (last visited Feb. 20, 2012); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil
Disabilities of Convicted Felons: A State-By-State Survey, NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE
SERVICE, 29–30 (Oct. 1996) https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/195110.pdf.
237
See California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, HOW TO APPLY FOR A PARDON: STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF GOVERNOR, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/BOPH/docs/apply_for_pardon.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2012).
238
See e.g., COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, EXPUNGEMENT, available at
http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/public_defender/expungement.html. Under California law, expunging a felony
conviction requires the individual to attend a formal court hearing regarding his or her expungement, with
the presiding judge having complete discretion over the matter. Id. Therefore, the hearing may require
calling witnesses, filing legal declarations, and preparing additional information for the court about the
individual’s particular circumstances. This requires money, time, and a good attorney. Indigent individuals
can seek assistance from the Public Defender’s Office and apply for a filing fee waiver, but these resources
are subject to eligibility. Id. Under California law, moreover, expungement is just the first step toward
obtaining a pardon for a felony conviction. Id. California Penal Code 1203.4 also makes clear that the
felony case is not sealed, but simply “dismissed,” which means that the conviction remains on the record.
Thus, there are numerous limitations to expungements. See also Samara Marion, Justice by Geography - A
Study of San Diego County's Three Strikes Sentencing Practices from
July–December 1996, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 29 (1999) (California’s three strikes law allows nonviolent offenses to be elevated to a felony and to be tried as a second or even third felony strike,
dramatically increasing the number of felons in the state).
235
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since over 165,000 Californians are in jails and prisons,239 with racial minorities
constituting 73% of the male prison population and 52% of the female prison
population.240 In fact, Latinos alone comprise 38% of male prisoners, 28% of female
prisoners, and 64% of all foreign-born prisoners.241 These numbers suggest that racial
and linguistic minorities are disproportionately represented in jails and prisons, and that
felon jury exclusion may be a strong contributor to the low incidence of racial and
linguistic minorities serving on California juries. However, if convicted felons who have
completed their sentences are made eligible for jury service, legislators and courts would
also need to establish procedures to mitigate against convicted felons being challenged
and dismissed disproportionately; otherwise, the positive impact on jury diversity could
be severely undercut.
Finally, state legislators should allow non-county residents to participate in jury
service.242 Given the exceptional mobility of California’s low-income minorities,243
allowing individuals to serve regardless of their county residence status would
significantly increase the pool of linguistic minorities eligible for jury service. Indeed, a
study based on 1999 to 2000 showed that approximately 16% of Californians were
disqualified from jury service,244 and that the second “most common reason for
239

Paul Guerino, Paige M. Harrison & William J. Sabol, Prisons in 2010, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
14 (2011) http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf.
240
Amanda Bailey & Joseph M. Hayes, Who’s in Prison? The Changing Demographics of Incarceration, 8
PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. 1, at 4 (2006), http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=701 (last visited Feb.
20, 2012).
241
Id. at 6.
242
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 203 (West 2012) (persons are disqualified from jury service if they are not
residents of the county or jurisdiction wherein they are summoned to serve). The proposal to allow noncounty residents to participate in jury service is in keeping with the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage clause
that provides an accused with an impartial jury in his or her vicinage. See Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d
1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not decided whether the Sixth Amendment’s
vicinage clause applies to the states. Nor has the Court defined the scope of a state defendant’s federal
vicinage rights, such as what constitutes the ‘district’ in the state context or whether the vicinage
requirement allows a crime committed in two different countries to be tried by a jury drawn from either
one.”). No state has yet applied the measure suggested by the author here, probably due to the associated
costs of having to track county and non-county residents for jury summonses. However, this measure
would provide greater incentive for a state to improve the representativeness of registration lists and source
lists from which the names of prospective jurors are drawn. Indeed, a 2002 study examining California
juries reports that over 16% of jury summonses and affidavits were undeliverable due to inaccurate state
address records. Daniel Klerman, A Look at California Juries: Participation, Shortcomings and
Recommendations, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, at 6 (Sep. 2002), available at
http://lawweb.usc.edu/users/dklerman/PDFs/A%20Look%20at%20California%20Juries%20Participation%
20Shortcomings%20and%20Recommendations.pdf. This highlights the need for California to take serious
and immediate steps to improve their lists to successfully track potential jurors.
243
HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY in THE PLENUM SERIES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE 45 (James
A. Fox et al. eds. 1993) (minorities’ low-income status and involvement in secondary labor markets
increases their mobility and, by extension, decreases their jury eligibility); Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman
Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1033, 1055 (2003) (greater mobility, which causes low response rates to jury summonses, and
financial hardship play an important role in minority participation in jury service).
244
Daniel Klerman, A Look at California Juries: Participation, Shortcomings and Recommendations, AM.
TORT REFORM ASS’N, at 6 (Sep. 2002), available at
http://lawweb.usc.edu/users/dklerman/PDFs/A%20Look%20at%20California%20Juries%20Participation%
20Shortcomings%20and%20Recommendations.pdf.
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disqualification . . . [was] non-residence in . . . [the California] county that summoned
them.”245 Thus, lifting the county residence requirement for jury service would help to
offset the negative impact of socioeconomic constraints on minorities’ exercise of civil
rights by enabling more extensive participation on the part of members of linguistic and
other minority groups, who are currently underrepresented in the jury selection process.
D. Recommended Jury Instructions Regarding “Official” English Translations
The Ninth Circuit currently offers a manual on criminal jury instructions for use by
district courts.246 This manual contains, among others, a model jury instruction with
respect to official English translations.247 The instruction is as follows:
§ 1.12. Jury to be Guided by Official English Translation/Interpretation.
[A language] [Languages] other than English will be used for some
evidence during this trial. [When a witness testifies in another language,
the witness will do so through an official court interpreter.] [When
recorded evidence is presented in another language, there will be an
official court translation of the recording.]
The evidence you are to consider and on which you must base your
decision is only the English-language [interpretation] [translation]
provided through the official court [interpreters] [translators]. Although
some of you may know the non-English language used, you must
disregard any meaning of the non-English words that differs from the
official [interpretation] [translation].
[You must not make any assumptions about a witness or a party
based solely upon the use of an interpreter to assist that witness or
party.]248
Although the final sentence above rightly instructs jurors to avoid making inappropriate
assumptions about a witness or party based on the fact that the court requires the witness
to depend on a court interpreter (i.e., based on his or her status as a multilingual or nonEnglish speaker) to prevent juror bias, the premise of requiring jurors to restrict
themselves to a specific translation of a language that they understand is fundamentally
245

Id. at 10.
See Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions: Criminal, 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 3.1 (2010),
available at
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/web/sdocuments.nsf/d4f8f49f20ea8ab3882564bb000fc20d/$FILE/1_2012_F
inal_Criminal.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2012). The Ninth Circuit also offers an instruction for English
translations in civil cases. However, because this instruction is a diluted version of the criminal instruction,
I focus my discussion only on the latter. See manual for civil instructions at Ninth Circuit Manual of Model
Jury Instructions: Civil, 9TH CIR. CIV. JURY INSTR. 3.1 (2007), available at
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/web/sdocuments.nsf/1ae2dda702db203388256aae0064d796/$FILE/1_2012
%20final%20civil.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2012).
247
See Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions: Criminal, 9TH CIR. CRIM. JURY INSTR. 3.1 at 14
(2010) (§ 1.12: Jury to be Guided by Official English Translation/Interpretation).
248
See id. at 14.
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flawed. Indeed, this insistence obviates the use of a linguistic resource present in court—
namely, the jurors—to act as a check on the official translation’s veracity or accuracy. At
present, no mechanism exists to take advantage of this dynamic. In other words, forcing
multilingual jurors to accept only the court interpreter’s translation prevents them from
directing the court’s attention to questionable or outright erroneous translations, which
then become part of the trial record and part of the basis for the jury’s determination.
As noted above, the notion that jurors faithfully and infallibly follow court
instructions is a methodological premise and a procedural goal, not a perfect reflection of
reality. The idea that multilingual jurors can simply “disregard” any meanings of nonEnglish words that differ from the court interpreter’s translation is an excellent example
of this disparity. The present system of depriving multilingual jurors of the opportunity to
openly consider and perhaps correct what they perceive to be misleading or erroneous
translations is likely to result in these jurors feeling frustrated or confused by the
discrepancy between what they know or believe to be true and what they are told by the
court.249 By contrast, instructing juries to raise any issues related to questionable or
erroneous translations at the end of a witness’s testimony has a number of benefits. First,
the practice would foster greater accountability among court interpreters, incentivizing
them to provide more accurate translations (and may actually be instructional to courtappointed interpreters—making them better). Second, this change would enable
multilingual jurors to make an added contribution to truth and accuracy in the judicial
process. Finally, it would obviate the concerns about multilingual jurors exerting an
undue influence over their peers when deliberating matters involving translated
testimony, since translation issues would have already been dealt with during the course
of trial.
Indeed, this issue illustrates the fact that multilinguals are not only presently
underrepresented in jury service, their limited participation is undervalued and underutilized. Beyond allowing multilinguals to contribute their linguistic expertise to
determining what was or was not stated by witnesses, permitting the firsthand
consideration of non-English testimony would enable multilingual jurors to better fulfill a
core juror function: evaluating a witness’s credibility. By considering such testimony
directly, in other words, jurors with the appropriate language skills and cultural
background can evaluate more meaningfully the witness’s use of language, demeanor,
gestures, and other non-verbal expressions that are part of the communication system in
any linguistic sub-culture, that typically defy translation, and that can be crucial to
making accurate credibility determinations.250 Nuance and demeanor, for example, can
greatly affect the meaning that a witness wishes to convey, as well as a juror’s
understanding of the witness’s intent.251 Court interpreters may try to account for such
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One argument against allowing jurors to disagree with the court reporter’s interpretation is to promote
uniformity and efficiency of the judicial process because all jurors will be instructed to accept only the
court interpreter’s testimony without question. However, this argument is unsatisfying and highly
problematic for the reasons discussed in this section.
250
See Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121,
1129–31, 1135 (2000) (jurors are instructed and expected to evaluate all aspects of a witness’s testimony,
including the credentials via demeanor and other non-verbal expressions).
251
Id. at 1169–70.
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factors in the translations that they provide; however, even highly trained interpreters are
likely to be unable to fully capture these subjective aspects of a witness’s testimony.252
In this regard, providing a legitimate role for multilingual jurors’ firsthand
observations regarding the nuances of a witness’s use of language or gestures would have
a considerable impact on closing the gap between the handling of non-English testimony
and the evidentiary rule against hearsay.253 The hearsay rule excludes out-of-court
statements because a “witness under oath, subject to cross-examination, and whose
demeanor can be observed by the trier of fact, is a reliable informant.”254 Strictly
speaking, this rule could be invoked to question the use of interpreted testimony, which
stands at a distance from any “demeanor . . . observed by the trier of fact.” Input from
multilingual jurors on the role of demeanor and related nuances, from this standpoint,
should therefore not be systematically ignored, but should be openly valued and solicited.
In fact, California’s jury instruction on English translations offers, in the final line
of the passage quoted below, a corrective to the Ninth Circuit model:
§ 121. Duty to Abide by Translation Provided in Court.
Some testimony may be given in [insert name or description of
language other than English]. An interpreter will provide a translation for
you at the time that the testimony is given. You must rely on the
translation provided by the interpreter, even if you understand the
language spoken by the witness. Do not retranslate any testimony for other
jurors. If you believe the court interpreter translated testimony incorrectly,
let me know immediately by writing a note and giving it to the
(clerk/bailiff).255
However, based on the above discussion, the following modified version of jury
instruction should be considered as preferable (proposed changes shown in italics):
Some testimony may be given in [insert name or description of
language other than English]. An interpreter will provide a translation for
you at the time that the testimony is given. You may be able to understand
the language spoken by the witness. As jurors we expect you to draw on
your common sense and experience in evaluating witness testimony. If you
believe the court interpreter translated testimony incorrectly, let me know
252

One could argue that the ideal situation would be to have only those jurors who understand fluently both
English and any other language used at trial. However, this would violate the Sixth Amendment’s
“representative cross-section requirement,” and deprive a defendant of his or her right to a fair hearing by
an impartial and diverse jury that is made up of his or her peers.
253
See FED. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is inadmissible”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 (West 2012) (“Except as
provided by law, hearsay evidence is inadmissible”).
254
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970) (emphasis added).
255
See Criminal Jury Instructions: CalCrim 2012, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA (2012), at 22,
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/calcrim_juryins.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2012).
California’s criminal instruction on English translations was first introduced in January 2006, id., and is an
exact replica of California’s civil instruction, § 108, that was introduced in September 2003. See Civil Jury
Instructions: CACI, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA (2011), at 24, available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/caci_2012_edtion.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2012).
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immediately by writing a note and giving it to the (clerk/bailiff) and
refrain from retranslating any of the testimony for or in the hearing of
other jurors until such matters are resolved.
In its present form, California’s instruction rightly provides jurors with a judicially
sanctioned channel through which to raise translation concerns.256 The instruction,
however, suffers from the same problem as the Ninth Circuit model in that it insists that
jurors rely only on the court interpreter’s translation. The implication is that the
acceptance of an official interpretation would lead to greater objectivity in judgment.
However, no data exist to support this conclusion. Moreover, this implication may be
expected to discourage multilingual jurors from bringing language issues to the court’s
attention, despite the invitation to do so, particularly in light of the fact that the present
instruction specifically bars them from sharing relevant observations and perceptions
with their fellow jurors at any time.257 The proposed revision, therefore, restates jurors’
potential understanding of non-English testimony in neutral or positive terms and leaves
open the possibility that such jurors may discuss this understanding with, or in the
hearing of, their peers at the appropriate time.
VII. CONCLUSION
Examination of California case law in the twenty years since Hernandez
demonstrates that the pretext analysis for linguistically motivated peremptory challenges
remains both an arbitrary and a flawed tool that courts have, nevertheless, been reluctant
to second guess. The goal of voir dire is to elicit meaningful information about
prospective jurors’ ability to weigh the facts of a case and the arguments of litigating
parties, with fairness and impartiality, and Hernandez has failed to further this goal. The
resulting situation, in which language-based exclusions are widely allowed, denies
linguistic minorities their right as members of the community to serve on juries and, thus,
to participate in an important aspect of civic life. Language-based exclusions also deprive
litigants and the courts of diverse juries that are demonstrably better decision makers, and
that practice balance and impartiality during deliberations.
These exclusions ultimately affect not only individuals and minority groups, but
society as whole. Indeed, the systematic pattern of exclusion caused by the legal
mechanisms, practices, and associated factors discussed in this paper yields juries that do
not adequately reflect a representative cross section of California’s population. Moreover,
an examination of this issue in other states and localities likely presents the same weighty
concern.
In the end, the abolition of the peremptory challenge may be the ideal response to
this quandary. Given the remoteness of this possibility at the present time, however, it is
clear that there is a pressing need for careful review of Hernandez, and for the crafting of
practical and workable remedies that can limit its negative impact on juries not only in
California, but other jurisdictions as well. The suggestions proffered in this Article are
256

The instruction for multilinguals not to retranslate testimony for other jurors is based on People v.
Cabrera, 230 Cal.App.3d 300, 305 (2d Dist. 1991) (the actions of bilingual jurors in retranslating the
official testimony is “misconduct”).
257
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not intended to be exhaustive. They can, however, provide a starting point in offering
options and alternatives for use by attorneys and courts, as well as in suggesting
directions that might be taken by state legislatures. The latter, after all, have the power to
shape state laws so that they better support the equitable representation of all members of
their diverse citizenry. Legislative action designed to more effectively represent speakers
of languages other than English in the state’s population and on juries would further this
goal by improving the representative nature of jury composition, as well as affording
protection to linguistic minorities’ civil rights.
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